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Abstract 
As agriculture remains the economic engine of rural Africa, reducing poverty in Africa will 
depend largely on stimulating agricultural growth. To realize this growth, the efficient allocation 
of a country’s scarce natural resources becomes a prerequisite. Rwanda is endowed with 
extensive wetlands with a high potential for rice production due to its hilly topography, abundant 
rainfall, and warm temperatures. However, many of these wetlands remain uncultivated despite 
the prevailing rice deficit in the domestic and regional markets. 
Over the past decade, Rwanda has increasingly become dependent on regional and global 
markets for rice, as domestic supply is unable to keep pace with the growing domestic demand. 
This production deficit has limited the potential gains that farmers and the nation could realize in 
the form of income and foreign exchange earnings. 
The main objective of this study is to determine Rwanda’s comparative advantage in rice and to 
identify constraints limiting efficiency. To achieve this objective, this study utilizes the Policy 
Analysis Matrix (PAM) to measure the comparative advantage in rice production and the level of 
inefficiencies within the rice subsector in the Eastern Province of Rwanda. The key findings of 
the analysis demonstrate that this province has a comparative advantage in rice. However, within 
the sample, 68 % of rice farmers’ cooperatives, cultivating rice on 25% of the total area under 
study, have no comparative advantage. 
In terms of net welfare gains, due to market distortions, domestic rice prices are artificially high, 
which creates a deadweight loss in the rice market. In particular, the protectionist policies (i.e. 
rice import tariffs and farm inputs subsidization) induce the private farm profit to outweigh the 
social farm profit. This abnormal profit allows rice production to become financially profitable 
even where there is a comparative disadvantage. 
On the demand side, although the domestic price of imported rice in Rwanda is slightly higher 
than the local rice price, the majority of consumers prefer imported rice to local rice, due to its 
long grain shape, aroma, and good quality. The low domestic demand for bold and short grain 
rice, which is cultivated by 70 % of Rwandan rice farmers, limits domestic rice producers’ 
market share. 
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Given the study’s findings, the policy recommendations are threefold. The first involves 
technology dissemination and adoption. In order to improve the domestic rice production 
capacity and competitiveness, without compromising efficiency, it is imperative for rice farmers 
to adopt labour saving technologies. This technology adoption would allow for an increase in the 
area on which rice can be grown efficiently, due to a reduced social production cost. The second 
recommendation is that government should encourage research on the identification of aromatic 
and long grain rice varieties that can adapt to Rwanda’s agroecology, thereby meeting 
consumers’ demand preferences. Finally, though rice import tariffs protect domestic farmers 
against foreign competition, these policies decrease consumers’ welfare due to a reduction in the 
range of rice consumed in the domestic market. This study recommends the government to 
facilitate exportation of local rice in regional markets, and reduce rice import barriers. This 
intervention would benefit both farmers and consumers, while stabilizing the trade balance. 
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Opsomming 
Aangesien landbou steeds die ekonomiese enjin van landelik Afrika is, sal die vermindering van 
armoede grootliks afhang van die stimulering van groei binne landbou. Die doeltreffende 
toedeling van ‘n land se skaars hulpbronne is ‘n voorvereiste om hierdie groei te verwesenlik. 
Rwanda het ekstensiewe vleilande met ‘n hoë potensiaal vir rysproduksie as gevolg van die 
heuwelagtige topografie, oorvloedige reënval en warm temperature. Baie van die grond is egter 
steeds onbewerk desnieteenstaande die heersende rystekort in die plaaslike en streeksmarkte. 
Oor die afgelope dekade het Rwanda toemend afhanklik geraak van streeks- en globale markte 
vir rys aangesien plaaslike aanbod nie kan byhou met die toemane in plaaslike vraag nie. Die 
produksietekort het die potensiële voordele wat boere en die volk kan realiseer in die vorm van 
inkomste en buitelandse valuta, beperk. 
Die hoofdoelwit van die studie is om Rwanda se vergelykende voordeel in rys te bepaal en om 
die beperkings ten opsigte van doeltreffendheid te identifiseer. Om hierdie doelwit te bereik, het 
die studie die Beleidsanalise Matriks gebruik om die vergelykende voordeel in rysproduksie en 
die vlak van ondoeltreffendheid in die ryssubsektor van die Oostelike Provinsie van Rwanda, te 
meet. Die kern bevindinge van die analise dui daarop dat die Oostelike Provinsie van Rwanda ‘n 
mededingende voordeel in rys het. In die steekproef is daar egter 68% van die rysprodusente 
koöperasies wat geen mededingende voordeel het nie.  
In terme van netto welvaartsvoordele, as gevolg van verwringing in die mark, is die plaaslike 
prys van rys onnatuurlik hoog, wat ‘n dooieverlies skep in die rysmark. Spesifiek, die 
beskermende beleide (d.i. rys invoertariewe en plaas insetsubsidies) het tot gevolg dat private 
boerdery wins groter gewig dra as die sosiale boerdery wins. Die abnormale wins laat toe dat 
rysproduksie finansiëel winsgewend word selfs al is daar ‘n vergelykende nadeel. 
Aan die vraagkant, al is die plaaslike prys van ingevoerde rys in Rwanda ‘n klein bietjie hoër as 
die plaaslike rysprys, verkies die meeste verbruikers die ingevoerde rys eerder as die plaaslike 
rys, as gevolg van die lang korrel vorm, aroma en goeie kwaliteit. Die lae plaaslike verbruik vir 
vet kort korrel rys, wat verbou word deur 70% van die Rwandese rysboere, beperk die plaaslike 
rys produsente se markaandeel. 
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Gegewe die studie se bevindings, is die beleidsaanbevelings drieledig. Die eerste behels 
tegnologie oordrag en aanvaarding. Om plaaslike rysproduksie kapasiteit en mededingendheid te 
verbeter sonder om doeltreffendheid af te skeep, is dit noodsaaklik vir rysboere om 
arbeidsbesparende tegnologie te aanvaar. Die tegnologie aanvaarding sal die area wat 
doeltreffend onder rys verbou word, vergroot as gevolg van verminderde sosiale produksiekoste. 
Die tweede aanbeveling is dat regering navorsing oor die identifisering van aromaties en lang 
korrel rys varieteite moet aanmoedig om aan te pas by Rwanda se agro-ekologie; om sodoende 
verbruikers tegemoet te kom met hulle vraagvoorkeure. Laastens, al beskerm invoertariewe van 
rys die plaaslike boere teen internasionale mededinging, verlaag hierdie beleide die 
verbruikerswelvaart as gevolg van ‘n verlaging in die verskeidenheid rys wat in die plaaslike 
mark verbruik word. Die studie beveel aan dat die regering die uitvoer van plaaslike rys in 
streeksmarkte fasiliteer en die invoerbeperkings op rys verminder. Die ingryping sal beide boere 
en verbruikers bevoordeel, terwyl die handelsbalans gestabiliseer word. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
1.1 Problem statement 
As agriculture remains the economic engine of rural Africa, reducing poverty in Africa will 
depend largely on stimulating agricultural growth (Christiaensen & Demery, 2007:30). 
Agriculture is an important sector in the Rwandan economy. In 2012, 71.7% of the total labour 
force derived their livelihood from agriculture (NISR, 2014b:93). In terms of national income, 
agriculture accounts for 33.3 % of the gross domestic product (GDP), making it the second 
largest contributor after the services sector, which contributes 45.1% (BNR, 2014a).  
Given the importance of the sector, it is therefore critical for the government of Rwanda to 
engage in appropriate policy-making to stimulate economic growth and reduce poverty. To 
realize this growth, the efficient allocation of a country’s scarce natural resources is a 
prerequisite. Appropriate policies that would stimulate the efficient allocation of resources 
include, among others, reducing trade barriers and promoting competition in domestic factor and 
outputs markets. 
Due to the importance of agriculture in achieving the national priority objectives of sustainable 
economic growth, food security, and poverty alleviation, the government of Rwanda has been 
actively involved in the agriculture sector. In 2004 the government prioritized the development 
of a select group of crops. These crops were chosen on the basis of the degree of their 
contribution to import substitution, export revenues, food security, sector growth potential, and 
profitability (MINAGRI, 2004b:16; MINAGRI, 2009:11-12). Rice was among the selected 
priority commodities1. In 2004 under the Rural Sector Support Project (RSSP), the government 
started to reclaim marshland, mainly for extending the area under rice cultivation (The 
Government of Rwanda, 2010:4). By 2007 under the crop intensification program, rice was again 
among the six priority crops selected (Kathiresan, 2011:13-14). This program consisted of a 
variety of sub-programmes that aimed at improving farmers’ productivity. 
                                                 
1
 Refer to MINAGRI (2004a:20); MINAGRI (2004b:16) 
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Although the strategic government intervention has resulted in a consistent increase in rice 
production over the past decade, Rwanda has increasingly become dependent on regional and 
global markets for rice. The domestic rice supply has been unable to keep pace with the growing 
domestic demand for rice. Furthermore, Rwanda remains a deficit rice producer, in spite of an 
estimated 79 200 hectares of high-potential land available for rice production. To date, more than 
80 % of this land remains uncultivated, thereby limiting the potential gains that farmers and the 
nation could realize in the form of income and foreign exchange earnings (Refer to NISR, 
2014a:4). 
1.2 Objectives of this study 
It is, therefore, imperative to understand why Rwanda remains dependent on rice importation, 
despite its endowment of abundant unused land with a high potential for rice production. In order 
to address this issue, this study attempts to achieve the following objectives:  
• Determine empirically Rwanda’s comparative advantage in rice production,  
• Identify areas of inefficiencies within the rice subsector, and 
•  Determine the appropriate policy measures to mitigate these inefficiencies. 
In order to achieve these objectives, the following sub-objectives must be fulfilled: 
1. Assess the policy environment pertaining to the Rwandan rice subsector. 
2. Illustrate how the Rwandan rice value chain is structured, organized, and performing. 
3. Gather data on input-output coefficients for rice farming in Rwanda. 
4. Determine the farm gate prices for these inputs and outputs, and then estimate 
corresponding social (economic or shadow) prices. 
5. Use the Policy Analysis Matrix to measure the comparative advantage of Rwanda in rice, 
and the level of inefficiencies induced by market distortions. 
6. Provide policy recommendations that can lead to the efficient use of resources. 
The underlying hypotheses of the study are the following: 
1. Given Rwanda’s abundance of wetlands, with a high potential for rice production and a 
relatively high rice yield in the region, Rwanda should have comparative advantage in 
rice production.  
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2. Market distortions, within input and output markets, result in a loss of Rwanda’s 
competitive position within domestic and regional rice markets. 
3. These distortions can be corrected through appropriate policy actions. 
1.3 Outline of the study 
The remainder of this report comprises five parts. Chapter 2 evaluates the policy environment 
that shapes the Rwandan rice subsector and assesses the structure, conduct, and performance of 
the Rwandan rice value chain. Chapter 3 reviews the available literature on the theoretical 
framework under which this study has been constructed. This purpose is accomplished by 
defining comparative advantage, explaining how comparative advantage determines the trade 
flow, elucidating different sources of market distortions, and how they affect social welfare and 
trade flow. Chapter 4 explains, in detail, the PAM as a computation model that is used to 
measure the comparative advantage of the Eastern Province of Rwanda in rice production, as 
well as the level of market distortions within the rice subsector. Next, the data required for 
constructing the PAM and the different methods used to gather this data are explained. Chapter 5 
is devoted to the presentation and interpretation of the study findings. In the first part of the 
chapter, the primary data collected by means of a farm survey are presented through a descriptive 
analysis of the key variables of the study. The data are useful for illustrating the yields, input 
quantities, expenditure, and revenue of a typical rice farming system in the Eastern Province of 
Rwanda. In the second part of the chapter, how input costs are disaggregated into tradable and 
non-tradable components is illustrated; this is followed by a presentation and discussion of the 
PAM results. Chapter 6 provides a summary of this study, by highlighting what its main purpose 
is, how the research questions are addressed, and what the results revealed. The chapter 
concludes by providing policy implications and recommendations. 
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Chapter 2 : Overview of the Rwandan rice subsector 
2.1 Introduction 
The rice subsector is important for the Rwandan national economy (MINAGRI, 2004b:19). Rice 
is produced by an estimated 94 275 households, and it accounts for 18 % of per capita energy 
supplied derived from cereals2 (NISR, 2014b:110; FAO Stat, 2014). Despite its natural 
endowments, Rwanda remains a net importer of rice, and in 2013 spent USD 27.6 million on 
imported rice, making rice the largest contributor to import values across all agriculture, forestry, 
and fishery products 3(ICT, 2014). 
Given its importance as a staple cereal, it is therefore critical to understand the operational 
environment that underpins to the Rwandan rice subsector. The objective of this chapter is to 
provide the context for the study, by outlining the policy environment that currently shapes the 
Rwandan rice subsector, and describing the structure, conduct, and performance of the Rwandan 
rice value chain. 
2.2 Basic condition: policy environment  
This section highlights the key policies that shape the Rwandan rice subsector. Table 2-1, below, 
summarizes the chronology of policies and events relevant to the Rwandan rice subsector from 
1975 to 2014. 
Table 2-1: Chronology of policies and events that affected the Rwandan rice subsector 
1975 Establishment of the state marketing organization Office pour la Promotion, la Vente et 
l’Importation des Produits Agricoles (OPROVIA). Its duties included managing food-aid 
distribution, as well as stabilizing market prices, through intra-regional food distribution and 
providing grain storage facilities. 
1985 Establishment of the parastatal APNI (Appui au Programme National Intrants). Its duties 
included importing and distributing mineral fertilizers and pesticides. Due to the subsidization of 
these inputs, the private sector was unable to compete with this parastatal institution. 
1986 The government introduced minimum producer prices for most basic food commodities, 
including rice. 
1992 Removal of quantitative restrictions on trade for all products imported. 
                                                 
2
 Beer excluded 
3
 Disaggregated at Harmonized System (HS) 4 
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1995 Start of the European Union (EU) fertilizer import programme, with a 50 % fertilizer price 
subsidy. 
A significant reduction in import tariffs. Among all imported products, the maximum tariff was 
reduced from 100 % to 60 %. 
1995-1996 Liberalization of the foreign exchange and interest rate; removal of price control programmes. 
The domestic marketing of agricultural commodities was liberalized. 
1996 Presidential order no08/14 of 03/05/1996 established the institutional framework for the 
privatization of government companies. 
1997 In order to conform to regional integration goals under the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI), 
Rwanda reduced the average tariff rate for all commodities, on aggregate, by two-thirds. 
Moreover, all export taxes and nontariff barriers were eliminated.  
1998 The level of fertilizer price subsidization declined from 50 to 20 %. 
Continued reduction in import tariffs; the maximum applied tariff rate declined to 40 %. 
1999 Issue of the ministerial degree banning the distribution of free or subsidized farm inputs, except 
in the cases of production shortage and emergency poverty alleviation programmes. This 
intervention was aimed at promoting private sector involvement in the input supply market, as 
they had been unable to compete with cheaper subsidized inputs. 
1999-2000 The private sector took a 100 % share of fertilizer importation. 
2000 Parliament approved law No. 05/2000 of April 19, 2000 and law No. 06/2000 of April 19, 2000, 
which respectively removed import duties and sales taxes for imported agricultural inputs. 
2004 Issuing of the Rwanda land policy, which transferred marshland ownership from individuals to 
the state. 
Under a world bank supported project called the Rural Sector Support Project (RSSP), the 
government started to reclaim marshland, mainly for extending the area under rice cultivation.  
2006 The government replaced private sector chemical fertilizer importation. Since then, the 
government has started to issue tenders to international companies, which would compete to 
supply it with inorganic fertilizers. Government would then sell these fertilizers to farmers at 
subsidized prices. 
2007 Start of the Crop Intensification Program (CIP), which aims at improving farmers’ productivity, 
mainly by facilitating farmers’ access to farm inputs (improved seeds and fertilizers), promoting 
land consolidation, providing extension services, and improving post-harvest handling and 
storage mechanisms. The six priority crops under this program are maize, wheat, rice, Irish 
potato, beans, and cassava. 
2009 Rwanda integrated into the East African Community (EAC) customs union, where the Common 
External Tariff (CET) for rice was set at 75%. 
2012 Issuing of instruction of the minister of trade and industry N019 of 3rd November, 2012 on rice 
processing and trading. The main regulations are explained in the domestic trade and price 
support programme section (2.2.1.1) and in the value chain conduct section (2.4). 
2013 The government of Rwanda again handed over responsibility for importing and distributing 
chemical fertilizer to the private sector. The memorandum of understanding was signed between 
the government and three private companies: Top Services Enterprises Ltd, Alfred Nkubiri and 
Sons (Enas), and One Acre Fund-Tubura. 
The Rwanda Official gazette released on 16/06/2013 reemphasized that marshland areas belong 
to the state, and that marshland shall be leased to a person based on a mutual agreement between 
the two parties. 
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Sources: Baydas, Graham and Bicamumpaka (1995:15,31); GAIN (2012); IMF (2000); Kathiresan (2011:13-14); 
Kelly, Mpyisi, Shingiro and Nyarwaya (2001:6); Loveridge (1991:98); MINAGRI (2009:35); MINICOM (2012:4-
7); MINITERE (2004: 28-45); Monitor Group (2012: 8-11); Office of the Prime Minister (2013); Pottier (1993:5-
15); Pottier (2002:21); RDB (2014); The government of Rwanda (2010:4); Umuhinzi (2013); Vitalle, Morrison and 
Ramesh (2013:1) 
2.2.1 Domestic agricultural marketing policies 
2.2.1.1 Domestic trade and price support programme 
Prior to 1994, agricultural commodity markets were controlled and underpinned by the twin 
objectives of food security and production self-sufficiency. In 1982, the Rwandan government 
initiated the commodity price stabilization system, which was mainly implemented by its 
parastatal marketing enterprise ‘OPROVIA’ (Pottier, 1993:5). OPROVIA’s role was also to buy 
agricultural commodity surpluses at prices above free market prices, store, and then sell the stock 
during food supply shortages, at prices below free market prices (Pottier, 1993:6, 15). By 1986, 
the government had set minimum prices for staple commodities (Loveridge, 1991:98). While 
these floor prices were beneficial for farmers, they were at the expense of rural net food buyers 
(Loveridge, 1991:98).  
Following regional liberalization trends, in 1995 and 1996, the government undertook the 
process of reforming most of its economic policies. During this period, not only were the 
exchange and interest rates deregulated, but the government also liberalized agricultural 
commodity markets (IMF 2000:9-10). Furthermore, in 1996, the presidential order no08/14 of 
03/05/1996 established the institutional framework for the privatization of government 
companies (RDB, 2014). This framework resulted in the privatization of the rice milling sector. 
However, starting from 2010, the government re-entered the rice market, citing concerns about 
the quality of locally produced rice as a justification (Kathiresan, 2011:7). By 2012, under the 
instruction of the Minister of Trade and Industry (No19), a single-channel fixed-price marketing 
scheme was established for rice; local rural traders were banned, and small-scale rice mills were 
eliminated. Under this scheme, rice farmers were required to create or integrate into regional 
cooperatives. These cooperatives bulked and stored paddy rice from member farmers, and sold 
directly to licensed rice millers.  
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2.2.1.2 Input supply policies 
Fertilizers: Prior to 1994, fertilizer importation was constrained by a policy that restricted 
imports for the benefit of stabilizing the balance of payments (Verwimp, 2002:25-27). Moreover, 
government policies were biased toward export industries (tea and coffee), so that available 
fertilizers were directed mostly towards the production of these commodities (Verwimp, 
2002:27). Between 1995 and 1999, European donors took on the responsibility of importing 
fertilizers, with a 50 % rate of subsidization, which declined to 20 % in 1998 (Kelly et al., 
2001:6).  
Between 1999 and 2000, the government issued new policy regulations that restricted the 
distribution of subsidized farm inputs and that removed duties and sales taxes on imported 
agricultural inputs (Kelly et al., 2001:6). However, from 2006, under the CIP, fertilizer 
subsidization was reintroduced, with government being directly involved in fertilizer importation 
and price-setting. As a result, by 2012, government purchases accounted for 90 % of all imported 
fertilizers (Kathiresan, 2011:13-14; Monitor Group, 2012:8-11).  
It was in 2013 that the input importation and distribution system was restructured. The 
government withdrew its direct intervention in importing and distributing fertilizer, but 
continued to subsidize fertilizers (Green World Consult, 2014:91; MINAGRI, 2014b:12). 
Land market policies: Until 2004, Rwanda’s land tenure system in rural areas was mainly 
dominated by a customary law, under which the market for marshland was minimally regulated4. 
Given the excessive land fragmentation under customary land tenureship, in 2004 the 
Government established the National Land Policy (NLP). This land policy limited private 
property rights on marshland resources by converting traditional land to ‘state private land’ 
(MINITERE, 2004:28). Furthermore, the new land policy stipulated that the government shall 
lend marshlands to farmer’s groups (i.e. associations or cooperatives), with priority given to the 
landless poor (MINITERE, 2004:44-45). Under these land tenureship agreements, farmers 
would, depending on the region and agro-ecological requirements of the marshland, commit to 
producing specific crops, as determined by the government (MINITERE, 2004:45).  
                                                 
4
 Farmers had the ‘right to use’ marshlands, and they could easily transfer this right through the land rental market.  
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As mentioned by Gathani and Stoelinga (2013:109), the limited land use rights, in Rwanda, are a 
potential barrier for agro processing industries, including rice mills, willing to integrate into the 
upstream level of the commodity value chains. Most of these processing industries operate under 
capacity due to a shortage of raw materials. 
2.2.2 Domestic trade policy (tariffs and trade agreements) 
Prior to 1993, Rwandan trade policies were restrictive: the lowest applied average tariff rate was 
35%, and one third of government revenue was generated from international trade taxes (IMF, 
2000:42). By 1993, Rwanda had become part of the Cross Border Initiative (CBI). The 
objectives set out under the CBI were to reduce the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) maximum 
tariff to 25% and to eliminate all intraregional trade barriers (IMF, 2000:42). As result, from 
1995 to 1999 Rwanda reduced its maximum MFN tariff rate from 100 % to 25 %, and the share 
of international trade taxes in total government revenue declined from one-third to one-fifth 
(IMF, 2000:42-43). As a result of these policy actions, Rwanda’s trade restrictiveness index, as 
computed by the IMF, improved from eight in 1997 to two in 1999, making Rwanda the fastest 
trade-liberalizing country within sub-Saharan Africa. 
Due to its integration in regional economic communities, Rwanda was induced to default on its 
tariff rate commitments under the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement. For example, in 
2009, Rwanda adopted the East African CET, which resulted in 263 applied MFN tariff rates that 
exceed the WTO’s tariffs bound rates (WTO, 2012). Of these tariffs, there was the EAC-CET for 
rice, which was set at 75% ad valorem in 2005, as rice was classified within the group of 
sensitive products, due to a perceived need to protect regional rice producers (GAIN, 2012; 
WTO, 2012). Despite the 75% EAC-ECT, Rwanda has often negotiated for a lower rice import 
tariff. In most of the cases, Rwanda was allowed to keep its import tariff at 30 % (EAC Gazette, 
2009:2; EAC Gazette, 2010:2; EAC Gazette, 2013:2). Table 2-2, below, summarizes Rwandan 
rice import duties from 2000 and the countries that have been benefiting from preferential trade 
agreements with Rwanda. 
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Table 2-2: Import duties for rice (semi-milled or wholly-milled) imported by Rwanda5 
 
Total ad valorem equivalent tariff       
Tariff Regime 2000 2002 2003 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
MFN applied duty 5.0% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 75% 30% 52.4% 
Preferential tariff for EAC 
countries - - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Regional tariff preference 
(COMESA
6
) for Eritrea - - - 3% 6% 6% 6% 15% 6% 10.5% 
Regional tariff preference for 
(COMESA) for Ethiopia - - - - - - - 68% 27% 47.2% 
Preferential tariff for COMESA 
countries members of the FTA
7
 - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Regional tariff preference 
(COMESA) for Uganda - - - 6% 6% 6% 6% 15% 6% 10.5% 
Source: Mac Map (2014) 
2.3 Domestic market structure 
The Rwandan rice value-chain comprises six distinct levels; these include input supply, primary 
rice production, processing, milled rice distribution, wholesaling, and retailing. The following 
section provides a brief description of each activity, which actors are involved at each stage, and 
how they are organized. Figure 2.1, below, graphically illustrates the Rwandan rice value chain 
structure, along with the volume flow of rice along the chain in 2013. The section concludes with 
a brief analysis of the value-chain, utilizing the Industrial Organization (IO) Structure-Conduct-
Performance (S-C-P) framework.  
                                                 
5
 Data for 2001, 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2009 were unavailable. 
6
 COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
7
 FTA: Free Trade Agreement 
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Figure 2-1: Structure and quantity flow of the Rwandan rice value chain in MT8, 2013 
  
 
 
                                                 
8
 Assumptions: The proportion of paddy rice harvested that is retained by farmers for home consumption was assumed to be 37 %, as it was estimated in Franchis (2012:14). 2. 
Paddy rice-to-milled rice conversion factor: 0.65. The proportion of rice used as seeds and wasted was assumed to be low; hence, it was not estimated. 
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Regional cooperative 
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2.3.1 Farm input distribution 
Both the private sector and government play a major role in the supply of inputs used in rice 
farming. The government leases marshland to rice farmers, and through the Rwanda Agriculture 
Board’ (RAB), facilitates farmers’ access to improved rice seed varieties. In addition, chemical 
fertilizers are imported by three licensed private companies, namely Importation Distribution 
Fertilizer (IDF) Co Ltd, Alfred Nkubiri and Sons, and One Acre Fund (Green World, 2014:91). 
The fertilizers are then sold at a subsidized price to farmers’ cooperatives through a voucher 
system. 
The private sector is involved in the supply and distribution of other farm inputs, such as tools, 
equipment, and pesticides, through retail shops and/or agro dealers who sell directly to farmers’ 
cooperatives.  
2.3.2 Paddy rice production and sale 
Production area and distribution: Rwanda is endowed with extensive wetlands with a high 
potential for rice production due to its hilly topography, abundant rainfall, and warm temperate 
climate (Carana Corporation, 2010:41; Gathani & Stoelinga, 2013:108; MINAGRI, 2011c:2). In 
general, rice is grown twice a year: firstly, during agricultural season A, which spans September 
to February of the following year; secondly, during Agricultural season B, which starts in March 
and ends in July of the same calendar year (NISR, 2014a:1). In 2014 the total area planted to rice 
was approximately 15 000 hectares, of which approximately 65% was double-cropped, while the 
remaining 35% was cultivated for one agricultural season, due to the high risk of flooding and 
insufficient water (The New Times Rwanda, 2014; Carana Corporation, 2010:41). 
The study area was the Eastern Province of Rwanda. This province is the largest producer of rice 
in Rwanda. Between 2007 and 2013, the Eastern Province accounted for 40 % of the national 
paddy rice produced, as compared with the Southern and Western provinces, with 30 % and 28% 
respectively (See Figure 2-2, below).  
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Figure 2-2: Distribution of rice production across Rwandan provinces; share in total 
national production between 2007 and 2013 
 
Source: Own compilation based on MINAGRI (various years) 
Farmers’ cooperatives: The number of rice farmers in Rwanda was estimated at 94 275 (NISR, 
2014b:110). Each of these farmers is a member of one of 95 cooperatives (RAB, 2014). Rice 
farmers in each rice marshland are integrated into one or more cooperatives, depending on the 
size of the marshland. In the Eastern Province, rice is produced in over 32 marshlands, under 40 
rice farmers’ cooperatives (RAB, 2014). The average farm size per cooperative and farmer, 
across the 31 sampled cooperatives, was 135.3 ha and 0.19 ha, respectively. The farmers’ 
cooperatives not only facilitate farmers’ access to inputs and markets, but they also serve as an 
institutional framework through which the government and its development partners offer 
different supports to farmers, aimed at increasing farmers’ productivity.  
Harvest, post-harvest activities and sale: At harvest, rice farmers in each cooperative take cut 
rice panicles to their respective cooperative’s storage facilities, which are often constructed 
within walking distance of the marshland. Farmers subsequently thresh, dry (under the sun), 
manually winnow, bag, and store the rice off-farm, at their respective cooperative. To identify 
rice owners, each rice bag is marked specifically as belonging to the owner. Afterwards, at the 
time of delivery, in the presence of the farmer, the cooperative weighs and records each farmer’s 
rice quantity. Finally, the cooperative sells paddy rice, on behalf of farmers, directly to milling 
plants or through cooperative unions.  
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Figure 2-3: Rice farmers threshing rice manually in Rwanda, at a cooperative’s drying and 
storage facilities 
 
Source: IRRI (2011), https://www.flickr.com/photos/ricephotos/5880122320/ 
2.3.3 Paddy rice processing (milled rice production) 
Licensed milling plants purchase paddy rice from farmers’ cooperatives, with which they have 
marketing agreements. Paddy rice is then processed into white (milled) rice. 
Table 2-3: Rice milling plants operating in Rwanda 
N Province District Milling plant Installed capacity  
1 Eastern Province Bugesera Mayange rice mill 2.5 MT/h 
2 Gatsibo Gatsibo rice mill 2.5 MT/h 
3 Kirehe Kirehe rice company Ltd 6720MT/year 
4 Ngoma Corimi 2.3 MT/h 
5 Nyagatare Nyagatare rice mill 2.5 MT/h 
6 Nyagatare Kayonza rice 1.8 MT/h 
7 Rwamagana Inter City Mills (ICM) Rwamagama 3 MT/h 
8 Southern province Gisagara ICM Gikonko 45 MT/day 
9 Gisagara Mukunguri rice 2.5 MT/h 
10 Huye Rwabuye rice 1.5 MT/h 
11 Ruhango Gafunzo rice 2.5 MT/h 
12 Western province 
  
Rusizi Ishema rice 5 MT/h 
13 Rusizi Bugarama rice (ICM Company Ltd) 4.5 MT/h 
14 Rusizi Mashyuza rice mill 2.5 MT/h 
15 Rusizi Dukorerehamwe Company Ltd 2.5 MT/h 
16 Rusizi Coticori 2.5 MT/h 
  
Source: Compiled based on The Government of Rwanda (2013:18); MINICOM (2013); 
MINICOM and RBS (2013) 
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As summarized in Table 2-3, above, in 2013 the number of operating rice mills in Rwanda was 
16. At that time, all rice mills could utilize less than 35 % of their combined capacity (Gathani & 
Stoelinga, 2013:117). This low capacity usage can be attributed to different factors, including 
among others, a shortage of primary rice supply, as reported by Gathani and Stoelinga 
(2013:117). 
2.3.4 White rice trading, wholesaling and retailing 
Licensed traders collect milled rice from milling plants and foreign rice exporters, store it, and 
then sell it to wholesalers (Kathiresan, 2013:13). Wholesalers then sell the rice to retailers, who 
collect and distribute it across the country through formal and informal retail outlets. According 
to Kathiresan (2013:19), domestic rice is consumed mainly in rural markets, as 65 % of rural 
household expenditure on rice is allocated to the local variety. On the other hand, imported rice is 
consumed mainly in urban markets, accounting for 62 % of urban household expenditure on rice.  
In general, 70% of domestic consumers prefer aromatic rice and long-grain rice (Kathiresan 
(2013:19). Although almost all imported rice is aromatic and long-grain, 70 % of Rwandan rice 
farmers produce short- and bold-grain rice, which is preferred by only 14 % of domestic 
consumers (Kathiresan, 2013:19). Moreover, local rice is of relatively low quality, due to a high 
impurity content and rice that is broken (Jagwe et al., 2003:28; MINAGRI, 2011:11).  
2.4 Market conduct 
Rwandan rice farmers are horizontally integrated. They are integrated into cooperatives and act 
collectively to control and manage the cooperatives. Each farmer has an agreement with the 
cooperative to supply all rice harvested to it. Furthermore, each farmer is required to adhere to 
the cooperative's regulations. These require using all appropriate inputs (i.e. fertilizers, pesticides, 
seeds, drying and storage facilities, etc.) availed by the cooperative to improve the rice yield and 
quality. Farmers are also required to respect the crop calendar for each farming activity as 
announced by the cooperative. 
Farmers’ rice cooperatives are vertically linked and integrated with the downstream rice milling 
level through forward marketing contracts as well as direct ownership. The 2012 “instructions of 
the minister of trade and industry on rice processing and trading” set out the terms of forward 
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contracts and required that farmers’ cooperatives had at least a 40% share in all rice milling 
plants9 (MINICOM, 2012:7).  
In some instances, rice mills provide extension services to cooperative member farmers as a 
means of ensuring the appropriate quality of paddy rice. There is low vertical integration between 
rice mills, traders, wholesalers, and retailers, as often they are inclined to work independently. 
However, there are instances where processors are vertically integrated with the wholesale/retail 
level of the value-chain; for example, ICM processing plant owns 12 retail outlets across the 
country (Gathani & Stoelinga, 2013:118). 
2.5 Value chain performance 
Production trend: Annual rice production increased tenfold between 1990 and 2013, rising from 
9 305 MT to 93 746 MT. This growth in output is attributed to both area expansion and yield 
increases. During this period the area harvested for rice rose from 6 816 hectares to 17 568 
hectares, while yields rose from 1.4 to 5.3 MT/ha10, see Figure 2-4, below (FAO Stat, 2013). This 
significant growth in rice production was underpinned by the government's intervention in the 
rice subsector, through financing marshland reclamation and rehabilitation, and by facilitating 
farmers' access to improved inputs. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9Refer to MINICOM (2012:7). ICM, the largest rice processing plant in Rwanda, is a joint venture between a foreign 
investor owning 60 % of the stake and farmers’ cooperatives with 40 % (Gathani & Stoelinga, 2013:65) (Gathani & 
Stoelinga, 2013) 
10
 The 5.3 MT/ha Rwanda rice yield is higher than the global average rice yield of 4.5 MT/ha, and higher than rice 
yields in regional countries such as Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, with 2.4, 
2.3, 5.2, 0.7 and 1.9 MT/ha respectively (FAO Stat, 2014). 
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Figure 2-4: Rwanda rice production trends: 1990-2013 
Source: FAO Stat (2014) 
Domestic rice consumption: Since 2004, Rwanda has experienced significant growth in rice 
consumption. Between 2004 and 2013, milled rice consumption increased from 30 000 MT of 
milled rice to 97 600 MT, see Figure 2.5, below. 
Figure 2-5: Consumption11 trend and sources of milled rice, HS100620; 100630; 100640 
(1000 MT) 
 
Sources: USDA FAS (2014); ITC (2014); FAO Stat (2014) 
                                                 
11Due to a lack of sufficient information on stock variation, feed, waste, and other uses, consumption was roughly 
estimated using the formula ‘Production+imports-Exports’. However, it is believed that missing data for these 
variables represent too small share for estimated consumption to divert significantly from the true consumption 
figures. 
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Though rice production has risen over the past decade, the increase is not sufficient to keep pace 
with growing rice demand, and as a result, Rwanda is increasingly becoming dependent on rice 
importation. Since 2004 the rice trade deficit has been increasing by 4 442 MT of milled rice 
each year, from 13 279 MT in 2004 to 42 638 MT in 2013 (see Figure 2.5, above).   
Trade: Given its deficit position in rice production, between 2004 and 2013, Rwanda spent, on 
average, USD 12.193 million each year on rice imports, making rice the largest contributor to 
import values among all agriculture, forestry and fisheries products (see Figure 2-6, below).  
Figure 2-6: Imports of agriculture, forestry and fisheries products (HS01-14) between 2004 
and 2013, in thousands US dollars, and ranked by order of importance 
 
Source: ITC (2014)  
The major source of rice for Rwanda is Pakistan, accounting for over 54 % of the total quantity of 
rice imported between 2009 and 2013. Tanzania and India follow with 28 % and 8 % of the 
market share, respectively (see Figure 2-7, below). However, there is substantial variability in the 
market share allocated to each country each year, due to production and price fluctuations in 
global rice markets.  
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Figure 2-7: Major exporters of rice (HS1006) to Rwanda, and rice importation trend, by 
volume, MT 
 
Source: ITC (2014)       
Price Movements: As illustrated in Figure 2-8, below, domestic rice prices are relatively higher 
than world rice prices. The higher relative domestic prices can be explained by the landlocked 
nature of Rwanda12, but also exist because of protective rice import tariffs (refer to Table 2-2, 
Import Duties for Rice). It seems that the reduction in the gap between domestic rice prices and 
regional13 rice prices, from 2006 to 2013, was induced by the removal of import duties for rice 
originating from EAC member countries, following Rwanda's integration into the EAC in 2009 
(Refer to Tables 2-1 and 2-2). During the same period, the growth rate in domestic and regional 
rice prices was, however, higher than the growth rate for world rice export prices, which might 
have been induced by trade diversion and increasing transportation costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 According to The World Bank (2010:217), as a landlocked country, transportation and related costs account for 
more than 40 % of the value of goods imported by Rwanda. 
13
 Wholesale rice prices for other regional countries, such as Burundi, DRC Congo and Kenya were unavailable. 
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Figure 2-8: Trend in wholesale real rice prices, constant 2013 prices, and world export rice 
prices. A comparative analysis among Rwanda and a selection of countries 
 
Source: FAO GIEWS (2014) 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter various factors were explored that affect the competitiveness of the Rwandan rice 
subsector. Section 2.2 is devoted to the policy environment relating to rice. It is illustrated that, in 
general, the government uses protectionist policies to provide incentives for domestic rice 
production. These policies consist of farm input subsidization, paddy rice price regulation, and 
rice import tariffs. On the other hand, the land policy that limits private ownership and usage 
rights pertaining marshlands has the potential to create disincentives for rice production. 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 assessed respectively the domestic market structure and the value chain’s 
conduct. It is shown that farmers’ cooperatives have improved the level of horizontal and vertical 
linkages within the rice subsector, which is likely to reduce transaction costs.  
In terms of demand, local rice varieties are mainly consumed in rural markets, while imported 
rice is mostly consumed in urban markets. Although most of the farmers cultivate short and bold 
rice, the majority of consumers prefer long rain and fragrant rice, of most of which is imported. 
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This final section provides a brief overview on the performance of the industry in terms of 
production, trade and price movements. It is illustrated that though Rwanda has recorded a 
consistent increase in rice production over the last decade, Rwanda is increasingly becoming 
dependent on rice importation. Moreover, this section reveals that domestic rice prices in Rwanda 
and the region are higher than those of the rest of the world, which can be attributed to existing 
protective rice trade policies, but also the landlocked nature of countries such as Rwanda.  
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Chapter 3 : Theoretical framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops the theoretical framework of the study. This involves an explanation of the 
theory of comparative advantage and a nation’s sources of comparative advantage as a means of 
predicting trade patterns. The second half of the chapter examines the nature of state-created 
market distortions and their effect on trade flows and welfare distribution. 
3.2 International trade theory 
3.2.1 Mercantilists 
The first writings on international trade date from the 17th and 18th centuries (Salvatore, 1990:20). 
During this period, a group consisting of merchants, bankers, government officials, and 
philosophers were promulgating a philosophy known as Mercantilism (Salvatore, 1990:20). 
According to this philosophy, trade was viewed as a zero-sum game (Pugel, 1990:33, Salvatore, 
1990:21). Mercantilists encouraged governments to impose import restriction measures and 
subsidize export industries in order to achieve positive net exports, which ultimately resulted in a 
national accumulation of precious metals (Pugel, 2007:33). 
3.2.2 Classical theories of trade  
Starting in the late 18th century, a new school of thought on trade theory emerged. Contrary to 
mercantilism, which encouraged governments’ intervention in trade, classical trade theorists 
viewed trade as a positive-sum game, and therefore argued in favour of free trade (Pugel, 
2007:33; Salvatore, 1990:20).  
3.2.2.1 Absolute advantage 
In 1776, Adam Smith, a moral philosopher and political economist, introduced the absolute 
advantage theory of trade, as a rationale for why nations engage in trade (Winch, 1992:91; 
Salvatore, 1990:22). This theory predicts that two nations should gain from trade if each of them 
can produce and export to the other the commodity in which they have absolute advantage. In 
other words, a country should specialize in the production of the good it can produce more 
efficiently than other countries (Pugel, 2007:32; Salvatore, 1990:22). 
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Using a market model, Smith illustrated the positive gains that could be realized through 
specialization and trade (see Figure 3-1, below). 
Figure 3-1: Gains from trade, partial equilibrium 
 
Source: Adapted from Brown and Hogendorn, (1994:41) 
Gains from trade: Under autarky, Nation 1 produces and consumes Q1 units of good A, whereas 
Nation 2 produces and consumes Q2 units of good A. Since the domestic price (P1) of good A is 
lower than the world price (Pw), Nation 2 has absolute advantage in good A. Therefore, according 
to Smith, Nation 2 should specialize in the production of good A and trade with Nation 1. 
Under a free trade scenario, the domestic price of good A decreases from P1 to Pw for Nation 1, 
while prices increase from P2 to Pw for Nation 2. With rising prices, Nation 2 increases domestic 
production to Q4, of which Q4-Q3 is exported; while for Nation 1, domestic production decreases 
to Q5, with Q6-Q5 being imported to meeting rising domestic demand.   
In terms of welfare, for Nation 1, consumer welfare increases by A+B+C+D, while the producer 
welfare decreases by A+B, resulting in a net welfare gain of area C+D. Likewise, for Nation 2, 
consumer welfare decreases by A+B, while the producer welfare increases by A+B+C+D, 
resulting in a net welfare gain of area C+D. 
3.2.2.2 Comparative advantage 
In 1817, David Ricardo further refined Smith’s Classical Trade Theory by developing the 
concept of comparative advantage and trade (Brown & Hogendorn, 1994:25, 28). According to 
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Ricardo, two nations will gain from trade if each specializes in the production and exportation of 
the commodity that it can produce at a lower relative cost; i.e. in which it has a comparative 
advantage (Heller, 1973:36). Therefore, though one of the two nations might be efficient 
(inefficient) at producing all the commodities, they can still gain from mutual trade as long as the 
two nations can produce these commodities at different relative costs (Pugel, 2007:35). 
The gains from trade, as explained by David Ricardo, can be illustrated using the production 
possibility curves (PPC14) and community indifference curves (CIC)15. In this simplified two-
good, two-country model, under autarky, for each nation, market equilibrium is indicated by the 
point where the production possibility curve is tangent to the community indifference curve. At 
this point, the slope of the tangent to the PPC and CIC is equal to the price ratio (Px/Py)16. Nation 
1 produces and consumes at point A (50 units of X and 60 units of Y), and Nation 2 produces and 
consumes at point A (80 units of X and 40 units of Y). 
Since the price17 ratio Px/Py is relatively lower for Nation 1 (PA= Px/Py =¼) than for Nation 2 
(PA’=Px/Py=4), nation 1 has a comparative advantage in the production and exportation of 
commodity X because it can produce X at lower relative opportunity cost. On the other hand, 
since the inverse of Px/Py (or Py/Px) is relatively lower for nation 2 (1/Pa’=1/4) than in Nation 1 
(1/Pa=4), Nation 2 has a comparative advantage in the production of Y because it can produce Y 
at a relatively lower opportunity cost. 
                                                 
14
 The PPC shows a combination of products that a nation could produce using all of its available resources and 
technology (Heller, 1973: 30). The PPC is concave from the origin since each nation must give up more and more of 
one commodity (increasing opportunity cost or marginal rate of transformation) by releasing just enough resources to 
produce each additional unit of the second commodity (Salvatore, 1990:47). 
15
 The community indifference curves (CICs) show a combination of commodities X and Y that give the same level 
of satisfaction to consumers. The CICs are negatively sloped and convex from the origin, since at the same level of 
satisfaction, the more X is consumed, the less and less Y must be consumed (decreasing marginal rate of 
substitution), and vice versa (Brown & Hogendorn, 1994:32; Salvatore, 1990:50). The higher the indifference curve 
is, the higher is the level of satisfaction. 
16
 This tangent represents also the national budget constraint, as it shows the combinations of X and Y that the nation 
can consume given available income. Reference is made to Pugel (2007:52,53). 
17
 The comparative advantage theory was based on the labour theory of value, according to which, relative 
commodity prices are a reflection of the comparative cost of production, which was measured in terms of labour 
productivity (Heller, 1973:39). In 1936, Gottfried Haberler introduced the ‘opportunity cost theory of international 
trade’ (Heller, 1973:39). Through this theory, the comparative advantage theory was further refined by measuring the 
comparative cost of production in terms of alternative production forgone (Heller, 1973: 39). This reformulation was 
aimed at addressing the limitations set by the assumption of labour being the only factor of production (Heller, 1973: 
39). 
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When the two countries open to trade, given their relative price rations, Nation 1 should 
specialize in the production and exportation of good X, while Nation 2 should specialize in the 
production and exportation of good Y.  
Under free-trade, at the market equilibrium, X's and Y’s relative prices will be the same in both 
nations (PB=PB’=Px/Py=1). At this price ratio, the market clears. In other words, the quantity of X 
that Nation 1 is willing to export (60 units of X) is equal to the quantity of X that Nation 2 is 
willing to import; and vice versa. 
Figure 3-2: Gains from trade; general equilibrium 
 
Source: Adapted from (Salvatore, 1990: 53, 56) 
Due to specialization there are 40 additional units of good X and Y produced. This incremental 
output is shared between the two nations through trade. The gains from trade are indicated by a 
shift to a higher community indifference curve (from CICI to CICII for Nation 1 and from CICI’ 
to CICII’ for Nation 2). After trade, the consumption level for each nation is beyond the 
production possibility capacity for each nation.  
The gains from trade for each nation are attributed to two factors. The first is the ability of both 
nations to sell at world prices, rather than at autarky prices, and the second is increased output as 
a result of specialization (Brown & Hogendorn, 1994:38). 
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3.2.3 Neo-classical theories of trade (sources of comparative advantage) 
According to classical economists, comparative advantage arises from differences in labour 
productivity, as labour was explicitly considered as the only factor of production (Salvatore, 
1990:103). However, they did not explain what the basis for productivity differences (PPCs 
shapes) was, apart from the likely differences in climate (Brown & Hogendorn, 1994:56; 
Salvatore, 1990:103).  
The neo-classical school of thought further refined Classical Trade Theory by examining the 
basis of comparative advantage. The most prominent neo-classical theory was modelled by the 
Swedish economists Eli Hesckscher and Bertin Ohlin in the 1920s and 1930s respectively 
(Brown & Hogendorn, 1994:57).  
The HO theory is constructed under two fundamental hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that 
countries are endowed with different factors of production, which are immobile between 
countries (Leamer, 1984:1). The second hypothesis states that these factors are used in different 
proportions to produce different goods (Leamer, 1984: 1). The HO theory argues that “a country 
will export the product(s) that use its relatively abundant factor(s) intensively, and import the 
product(s) that use its relatively scarce factor(s) intensively (Pugel, 2007:60).  
It should be noted that the HO model assumes only two factors of production, namely labour and 
capital, and the basis for the two nations to engage in trade is the prevailing differences in relative 
product prices across the two nations (Salvatore, 1990:104; Pugel (2007:59). These relative price 
differences arise from production capability differences, due to factor endowments (illustrated as 
different PPCs positions and slopes) and differences in consumer preferences (illustrated as 
different CIC positions and slopes) between the two nations (Pugel, 2007:59).  
3.3 Market distortions and their effect on trade flow and welfare 
Global trade patterns do not reflect the predicted trade flows of the Classical and Neoclassical 
Trade Theories18. For instance, trade between industrialized countries accounts for almost 50% of 
global trade, with more than 70% of industrialized countries' exports flowing to other 
                                                 
18
 While empirically testing the Heckscher-Ohlin model, in 1951, Wassily Leontief found that U.S exports were 
labour intensive and imports capital intensive, though U.S was relatively capital intensive than the rest of the world 
(Salvatore, 1990:142-143).  
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industrialized countries (Pugel, 2007:88)19. For Classical Trade Theory outcomes to hold, factor 
and commodity markets must be perfectly competitive, and there should be no impediments to 
trade (Salvatore, 1990:104; Lipsey, 1989:347; Winters, 1991: 24).  
In reality, these assumptions do not hold true, due to prevailing distortions in factor and output 
markets. Market distortions derive from two main sources. The first is market failure (i.e. market 
power or monopolistic structures, imperfect information, externalities, and public goods), and the 
second is policy distortions.  
The remaining part of this section focuses on policy-induced market distortions. Monke and 
Pearson (1989:22) classify these policies into three main categories, namely commodity, factor, 
and macroeconomic policies. 
3.3.1 Commodity price policies20 
Distorting commodity price policies are defined as those “commodity-specific actions that cause 
domestic prices to differ from world prices” (Monke & Pearson, 1989:22). Where these policies 
are applied, commodity market (private) prices diverge from corresponding social prices, creating 
a wedge between the interests of producers and consumers (Kirsten, Ohene-Anyang & Van 
Rooyen, 1998:528). These policies include subsidies (positive subsidies and taxes), direct 
intervention, and trade policies.  
Subsidies: According to Monke and Pearson (1989:22), subsidies can be classified as either 
positive, which is a payment made by the government, or negative, otherwise known as a tax 
(Monke & Pearson, 1989:22). In agriculture, negative and positive subsidies include (Ellis 
(1992:71-72): 
• a producer subsidy that is paid to farmers to cover the price differential between the 
targeted and actual farm gate prices, 
• taxes (levies) deducted on farm gate prices when farmers sell their produce to specific 
marketing agents, 
                                                 
19
 As reported by Krugman (1979), Lancaster (1980), Gruber (1967), Posner (1961), Vernon & Wells (1966), and 
Porter (1990), non-comparative advantage trade is driven by factors such as economies of scale, product 
differentiation, technology change, product cycle, and strategic government choices.  
20
 These policies are used for different purposes, including increasing agricultural output to achieve food security and 
food self-sufficiency, stabilizing farmers' income, stabilizing food prices, reducing the foreign exchange deficit 
through generating and saving foreign exchange, generating government revenue through collecting taxes, and 
promoting industrial growth by keeping the level of raw material prices low (Bale & Lutz, 1979:8; Ellis, 1992:69-70; 
Krueger, 1972:48; Liefert, Wescott & Wainio, 2013:9-10). 
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• taxes levied on raw materials (agriculture commodities) at the processing plants’ gate, 
• consumption subsidies applied on food commodities sold by retailers to specific 
consumer groups, 
• a consumption tax which is levied at the wholesale or retail levels. 
The effects of a positive production subsidy on trade flows and social welfare is illustrated in 
Figure 3-3. Without a subsidy, the good is sold in the domestic market at the world price (PW); 
quantity demand is Q4, of which Q1 is sourced from the domestic market, while Q4-Q1 is 
imported. 
Figure 3-3: Effect of a production subsidy on trade flows and social welfare 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brown and Hogendorn, 1994:174 
When the government introduces a unit price subsidy Sd, the supply curve shifts down and to the 
right, from S to SSUB because producers per unit cost have declined. The domestic consumption 
remains at Q4 because the world price (PW) prevails in the domestic market. On the other side, 
domestic producers gain competitiveness as they increase their production to Q2; the imports 
decrease to Q4-Q2.  
Since consumers are tax payers, the total amount of subsidy A+B+C provided by the government 
to domestic producers is a reflection of a consumer welfare loss. Of this consumer welfare loss 
A+B is gained by producers, while C is a deadweight loss to the economy. 
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Direct interventions: Commodity markets are also distorted by government interventions in 
regulating commodity prices. The common types of interventions entail using uniform, fixed or 
minimum commodity farm gate prices21 and regulation of staple food prices by setting fixed or 
maximum prices (Ellis, 1992:72). In some instances, due to food security concerns, the state buys 
surplus production directly from farmers, thereby setting a floor price in the market (Ellis, 
1992:72). 
Trade policies22: Trade flow patterns are also influenced by domestic trade policies. According 
to Brown and Hogendorn (1994:105), and Pugel (2007:147), these policies are classified into two 
broad categories: tax and non-tax policies. Tax policies comprise import and export tariffs, while 
non-tax policies include non-tariff barriers (i.e. import quota, discriminatory product standards, 
voluntary export restraints, etc.) and subsidies.  
Figure 3-4 illustrates that, for a small country23, an import tariff raises the domestic product 
market price above the world price. As a consequence, domestic consumption reduces from Q4 to 
Q3. The domestic producers gain market share in the domestic market, since they increase 
production from Q1 to Q2. The imports decrease from Q4-Q1 to Q3-Q2.  
In terms of welfare, an import tariff reduces national wellbeing. As illustrated in Figure 3-4, 
consumers’ welfare decreases by A+B+C+R+D, of which A+B is gained by domestic producers, 
while R is the government tariff revenue (consumption tax). There is a deadweight loss of C+D, 
since consumers lose more than the government, and producers gain.  
The area C reflects the extra cost of using resources in the production of the additional output Q2-
Q1, instead of importing the same quantity of the good in cheaper foreign markets (Brown and 
Hogendorn, 1994:114-115; Pugel, 2007:144). On the other hand, the area D reflects the loss in 
consumer satisfaction, due to a reduction in total consumption of the protected good (Brown and 
Hogendorn, 1994:114-115). 
 
 
                                                 
21
 These prices are usually communicated to farmers prior to the crop season (Ellis, 1992:72). 
22
 Trade policies are mostly used in developing countries, and they have been the most distorting policies used due to 
their effective ability to create a wedge between domestic product prices and world prices, as well as their cost 
affordability relative to output and input subsidies, which are costly for the government (Anderson, Valenzuela & 
van der Mensbrugghe 2010:52; Krueger, 1972:48). 
23
 A country is small if its trade cannot affect the world price (Pugel, 2007:131) 
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Figure 3-4: Effect of an import tariff on trade flows and welfare of a small country 
 
Source: Brown and Hogendorn, (1994:112) 
3.3.2 Factor policies 
As mentioned in section 3.2.3 (sources of comparative advantage), relative commodity prices 
between nations determine comparative advantage and trade patterns. These commodity prices 
are determined mainly by prevailing factor prices. Therefore, any government policy that distorts 
factor markets would indirectly affect commodity prices; hence, affecting free flow of 
commodities. 
Distorting factor policies comprise mainly: 
Price-regulating policies: In this category are included all regulations that directly affect the 
factor market price, by raising (or lowering) the factor market price above (or below) the free 
market price. There are among these policies, for instance, minimum wage regulations for 
unskilled labour, low land rental prices and fixed specific variable input (i.e. fertilizers) prices 
(Ellis, 1992:129; FAO 1960:72; Monke Pearson 1989:42). 
Taxes and subsidy policies: Governments may also distort factor markets by using tax and 
subsidy policy instruments. Often, the government uses taxes to raise revenue. On the other hand, 
input subsidies24 are provided, especially when there is a need to improve farmers' income, 
through reduced farm production costs, or as an incentive for farmers to adopt a new farming 
production technology (Cleaver, 1985:3,26; FAO, 1960:70-71).  
                                                 
24
 The government pays the subsidy directly to the input importer, to the domestic manufacturing plant of the input, 
or else to the parastatals involved in the distribution of the inputs to farmers (Ellis, 1992:129). 
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3.3.3 Macroeconomic policies 
There are different macroeconomic policies that distort factor and output markets. These include 
fiscal, budgetary, and monetary policies. Additionally, there are the exchange, interest, and wage 
rates, as important policy tools that are used to regulate the national economy (Monke and 
Pearson, 1989:52). 
This section explains the impact of the exchange rate. It will focus only on this policy instrument, 
since the exchange rate is often considerably distorted in most developing countries (Kruger, 
1972:58; Krueger, Schiff & Valdés, 1988:255). Moreover, government policies that indirectly 
affect agriculture through overvaluing the currency and protecting domestic industry have a 
greater impact on the agricultural sector than the other agriculture price policies do (Krueger et 
al., 1988:267). 
Exchange rate: Often, in most developing countries and centrally planned economies, 
governments intervene in the foreign exchange market, through overvaluing the currency. This 
generally results in higher domestic price inflation relative to inflation for the major trading 
countries (Cleaver, 1985:17). Currency overvaluation can also be a result of import restriction 
measures (i.e. tariffs and quotas). These restrictions raise domestic product prices relative to 
world prices, and consequently, overvalue the real purchasing power of the local currency 
relative to other foreign currencies (Cleaver, 1985:17). 
When the currency is overvalued, tradable products become mispriced relatively to non-tradable 
products (Anderson, Martin & van der Mensbrugghe, 2006:170; Little & Mirrlees, 1974:30), 
which affects the efficient allocation of resources. For instance, when domestic exporters 
exchange foreign currency received from selling abroad at world prices, at the official exchange 
rate, they receive less in domestic currency (Cleaver, 1985:17). This overvaluation creates, 
therefore, a disincentive for producing export commodities. Moreover, as a result of currency 
overvaluation, imported goods become relatively cheap in the domestic currency, thus 
discouraging the domestic production of import substitute goods (Cleaver 1985:17, 24, Little & 
Mirrlees: 1974:30)25.  
                                                 
25
 Governments also intervene in exchange markets by assigning multiple exchange rates to different exported and 
imported goods, as a strategy to restrict or promote the trade of those goods (FAO 1960:20); these multiple exchange 
rates have similar effects as other commodity trade policies (FAO 1960:20).  
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3.4 Summary 
Chapter 3 is devoted to explaining of the theoretical framework for this study. Section 3.2 
illustrates how nations gain from trade, due to the benefits arising from specialization. This 
specialization is based on comparative advantage, since each country tends to produce and export 
those commodities that they can produce at a relatively lower opportunity cost than the rest of the 
world can, in exchange for those commodities that it can produce at relatively higher opportunity 
cost.  
It is emphasized that countries have comparative advantage in the production of those 
commodities whose production requires intensive use of the factors of production with which 
they are abundantly endowed. However, though comparative advantage theory is broadly 
consistent in developing countries and agricultural sectors, it is emphasized that in industrialized 
countries and for non-food manufactured goods, trade is mostly based on factors other than 
comparative advantage. These factors include, among others, economies of scale, product 
differentiation, the technology gap, the product cycle, and production seasonality differences.  
Section 3.3 illustrates how factor and commodity market distortions alter trade flows (as 
determined by comparative advantage), which decrease social welfare. These market distortions 
arise from market failures and distorted government policies. Illustrated in the next chapter 
(Research Methodology) is how these market distortions are measured empirically, by using  
Policy Analysis Matrix parameters and indicators. 
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Chapter 4 : Research methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, under Classical Trade Theory, comparative advantage determines 
patterns of specialization and trade flows between nations, ultimately resulting in net welfare 
gains for both nations. As agriculture remains the economic engine for Rwanda, reducing poverty 
and ensuring household food security will depend largely on stimulating agricultural growth. To 
achieve this growth, Rwanda should specialize in the production of the commodities in which it 
has comparative advantage. The objective of this study is to determine whether Rwanda has a 
comparative advantage in rice. 
In section 4.2 of this chapter, different measures of comparative advantage are discussed. In the 
subsequent section 4.3, a detailed explanation of the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) theoretical 
model is presented. This model is used to determine the comparative advantage of the Eastern 
Province of Rwanda in rice and the level of distortions in input and output markets. Moreover, 
this section focuses on the variable estimates required to model the PAM., and describes the data 
used to construct the PAM as well as different data collection methods used. Finally, Section 4.4 
summarizes this chapter. 
4.2 Literature review: empirical methods of measuring comparative 
advantage 
This section reviews the different methods that are used to measure comparative advantage, 
including among others, the net social profitability (NSP), the domestic resource cost ratio 
(DRC), the social cost benefit ratio (SCB), the revealed comparative advantage (RCA), and the 
Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM). These methods have been used to measure comparative 
advantage in different countries, across different industries. For instance, using the NSP and DRC 
measures, Shahabuddin, Hossain, Mustafi and Narciso (2002) analyzed the comparative 
advantage of different rice production systems in Bangladesh, and revealed that this country has 
no comparative advantage in upland aus crop and deep water aman rice.26  
                                                 
26
 According to Razzaque and Rafiquzzaman (2007:64), Bangladesh has three major rice growing seasons, namely 
Aus, Aman, and Boro. The growing period for Aus, Aman, and Boro rice varieties ranges from mid-March to mid-
August, mid-June to November, and mid-December to mid-June, respectively. While Aus rice varieties are dwarf, 
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Moreover, Kirsten et al. (1998) demonstrated that South Africa has relatively more comparative 
advantage in inland wheat than irrigated wheat. Also, by using the DRC and SCB, Liefert (2002) 
revealed that Russia has a relatively higher comparative advantage in agricultural input industries 
than in agricultural production industries. With regard to the RCA measure, Coxhead (2007) 
revealed that poor Southeast Asian nations lost their comparative advantage in labour-intensive 
industries, and gained a comparative advantage in natural resource industries as a result of 
China’s economic prosperity. On the other hand, using the PAM, Yao (1997) demonstrated that 
Thailand’s government intervention in promoting crop diversification may create welfare 
inefficiencies because it has more comparative advantage to produce rice than other alternative 
crops. 
Among other studies that used one or a combination of these methods to measure comparative 
advantage are Ferto and Hubbard (2003), Mucavele (2000), Jooste and Van Zyl (1999), 
Kannapiran and Fleming (1999), Murphy (1989), and Estudillo, Fujimura and Hossain (1999). 
The following subsections illustrate how these measures are estimated. 
4.2.1 Net social profitability27 
This approach entails measuring and comparing the opportunity cost of producing and marketing 
an incremental unit of a commodity to the border price (Gonzales, Kasryno, Perez and Rosegrant, 
1993:40). This comparison allows for the determination of whether the production system has (or 
does not have) comparative advantage. 
Net social profitability can be expressed as the following formula: 
	 = 
 − ∑ 
 − ∑ 
 ∗ 	      (4-1) 
Source: Gonzales, et al., (1993:41) 
Where  is the import/export parity price for the output i;  is the quantity of the tradable 
input jth used in the production of one unit of i;  is the import/export parity price for the 
tradable input jth; bik is the quantity of the non-tradable input kth used in the production of one unit 
                                                                                                                                                              
thermosensitive, favorable under summer conditions, higher yielding, and of relatively poor quality; Aman rice 
varieties are photoperiod sensitive, higher yielding, and of good quality (Parsons, Newbury, Jackson, and Ford-
Lloyd, 1999:588). 
27
 ‘Net social profitability’ is also known as ‘net economic profitability’. 
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of i;  is the shadow (social) price for the non-tradable input kth; and Yi is the per hectare yield 
of the output i. 
An NSP>1 implies that the production system has comparative advantage, since the border price 
outweighs the opportunity cost of producing i. On the other hand, an NSP < 1 is an indicator of 
comparative disadvantage, since the border price is less than the opportunity cost of producing i. 
One of the important disadvantages of the NSP approach is that it generates an absolute value, 
expressed in unit measures such as $/ha, $/ton, etc. (Masters & Winter-Nelson, 1995:244). This 
absolute value makes it difficult to compare production systems with different unit measures 
(Masters & Winter-Nelson, 1995:244). 
4.2.2 Domestic resource cost (DRC)  
The DRC measures the “opportunity cost of producing or saving foreign exchange” (Bruno, 
1972:16). It is the ratio of total domestic factor social costs over the value added in tradable 
goods (inputs and outputs) (Bruno, 1972:16).  
The DRC ratio is expressed as the following formula: 
 =
∑ 
∑ 
  (4-2) 
Source: Hassan and Faki (1993:7)  
Where i is the product of the system under analysis, N is the opportunity cost of the domestic 
factor r, Xri is the quantity of domestic factor r used in the production of i, Pi is the import/export 
parity price for the tradable product i, Qi is the quantity of the output, Rj is the import/export 
parity for the tradable input j, while Qji stands for the quantity of the tradable input j used to 
produce the product i.  
For a production system to have comparative advantage, two requirements need to be fulfilled. 
First, the production system must earn foreign exchange. To achieve this, the foreign exchange 
cost of all tradable inputs used must be less than the foreign exchange value of all produced 
tradable outputs. From the formula (4-2), above, this occurs when the denominator is positive. In 
other words,  − ∑   >0. 
Second, the foreign exchange earned must outweigh the opportunity cost of domestic factors 
used. It should be noted that there are two ways of calculating the ratio. The first is in local 
currency; in this case the interpretation of DRC depends on its absolute value relative to 1. The 
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second is to express the numerator in local currency and the denominator in foreign currency; in 
this case the interpretation of DRC depends on its absolute value relative to the effective or 
parallel exchange rate (e). In other words: 
• If the 0 < DRCi < 1 or DRCi < e, it implies that the use of domestic factors in the 
production of the product i save foreign currency. In other words, the production system 
has a comparative advantage, since less domestic currency is spent to produce i than 
would be spent if the product was imported. 
• If the DRCi > 1 or DRCi > e, it indicates that the country would spend more local currency 
to produce i than would be spent if i was imported. Thus, the production system under 
analysis has a comparative disadvantage. 
One of the disadvantages of the DRC indicator is that it overstates the profitability of production 
systems with significant uses of tradable inputs (Masters & Winter-Nelson, 1995:244).  
4.2.3 Social cost benefit (SCB) ratio  
The social cost benefit ratio is another alternative measure of comparative advantage. The SCB is 
obtained by subtracting the ratio of the net social profit over social farm revenue from 1. This 
ratio is expressed as the following formula: 
 = 1 −
"	()

                       (4-3) 
Source: Masters and Winter-Nelson (1995:245) 
Where Qi is the quantity of output for commodity i, Pi is the unit social opportunity cost for the 
output (which is the import/export parity price in the case of tradable output), and NSP (Qi) is the 
production system’s net social (economic) profit, as defined in Equation (4-1).  
If the absolute value of the SCB falls between 0 and 1, this is an indication of comparative 
advantage, while an SCB value of greater than 1 indicates that the production system has no 
comparative advantage (Masters & Winter-Nelson, 1995:245).  
Contrary to the NSP, the DRC and SCB ratios can be used to compare different production 
systems whose budgets are expressed in different unit measures. Moreover, with the SCB ratio, 
one can overcome the likely modelling errors that may derive from the separation of tradable and 
non-tradable components within the input costs, as is the case for the DRC ratio (Masters & 
Winter-Nelson, 1995:245). 
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4.2.4 Revealed comparative advantage (RCA)  
Since it would be otherwise difficult (if not impossible) to get autarky price data to measure 
comparative advantage, the RCA uses realized trade flow as a reflection of comparative 
advantage (Balassa, 1977:327). The RCA export ratio is expressed as the following formula: 
% =
&

/
&(
(
  (4-4) 
Source: Adapted from Bowen (1983:465); Yeats (1985:61) 
Here the subscripts i and j represent the product and country under analysis respectively. The 
subscript w stands for the world. xij represents country j’s exports value of product i, and xwj for 
the world’s total exports of product i. On the other hand, Xj stands for country j’s total exports, 
and Xw for the world’s total exports. 
An RCAij of less than 1 implies that country i has a revealed comparative disadvantage in product 
j, while an RCAij of greater than 1 is an indicator of revealed comparative advantage. 
4.2.5 Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM)  
The PAM is an accounting matrix, constructed using enterprise budget data. Through a 
comparison of private and social values, the PAM generates six indicators of comparative 
advantage, economic efficiency, and the level of market distortions in inputs and output markets.  
Given its multipurpose uses, it has been used extensively in the trade literature to determine 
comparative advantage in developing countries. For instance, Khai and Yabe (2013:161) used the 
PAM to measure the comparative advantage of soybean production in Vietnam; Mahlanza, 
Mendes and Vink (2003), for the comparative advantage of wheat production in the Western 
Cape, South Africa; and Finkelshtain, Kachel and Rubin (2011), for studying the competitiveness 
and agricultural trade of Israeli agriculture. Moreover, Basavaraj et al. (2013:31) used the PAM 
to assess the competitiveness of sweet sorghum for ethanol production in India; Fang and Beghin, 
(2000), for studying food self-sufficiency, comparative advantage and agricultural trade in 
Chinese agriculture; and Kydd, Pearce and Stockbridge (1997:323), for an economic analysis of 
the commodity systems, by extending the Policy Analysis Matrix to account for environmental 
effects and transaction costs. 
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The PAM derives its strengths from its ability to perform a detailed level of disaggregation and to 
reveal various policy-induced effects on the economic efficiency of a production system 
(Basavaraj, Rao, Achoth & Reddy, 2013:34). However, its major weakness is that it is a static28 
model. This weakness is overcome by doing a sensitivity analysis, in which key drivers of 
comparative advantage are changed to determine to what extent comparative advantage is 
sensitive to each key driver (Mohanty, Fang & Chaudhary, 2003:68; Kirsten et al., 1998:535). 
As mentioned in chapter one, this study is constructed under two fundamental hypotheses. 
Firstly, since Rwanda is endowed with abundant marshland with a high potential for rice 
production and a relatively higher rice yield than the global rice yield, Rwanda has a comparative 
advantage in rice. Secondly, market distortions within input and output markets result in a loss in 
Rwanda’s competitive position within domestic and regional rice markets.  
To test these hypotheses, this study addresses two main objectives: firstly, to determine 
empirically Rwanda’s comparative advantage in rice production, and secondly, to identify areas 
of inefficiencies within the rice subsector. To achieve these objectives, the PAM method was 
chosen and used because it measures both comparative advantage and the level of market 
distortions. Additionally, the PAM generates the NEP and DRC ratio indicators, which were 
illustrated in section 4.2, as alternative measures of comparative advantage. To overcome the 
static weakness nature of the PAM, a sensitivity analysis is conducted.   
The next section explains in detail the PAM model, and illustrates variable estimates required to 
model the PAM. 
4.3 Research methodology 
The Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) is a computational framework developed by Monke and 
Pearson (1989). It is used in policy analysis to assess the impact of policies on the 
competitiveness and economic efficiency of farm production systems. According to Monke and 
Pearson (1989:10), the PAM is primarily used to address: 
 the extent to which government policies affect farm profitability or competitiveness, 
 the likely impact of planned public investment on the economic efficiency or comparative 
advantage of a production system, 
                                                 
28
 Measures comparative advantage at one point in time 
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 the impact of research policies on technological change. 
For the purposes of this study, the PAM is used to determine the comparative advantage position 
of Rwanda in rice, and the impacts of government policies on the competitiveness of the rice 
subsector. 
4.3.1 Data description and collection methods 
The data that were required for modelling the PAM were rice yields, input requirements, farm 
gate prices for inputs and outputs, international world prices for tradable inputs and outputs, 
transportation and marketing costs, insurance costs, the exchange rate, taxes, and subsidies. The 
data on yields, input requirements, and farm gate private prices were primary data collected by 
means of a farm survey. This survey was conducted in August 2014, in the Eastern Province of 
Rwanda.  
Though the study aimed at studying rice production in all 40 rice farmers’ cooperatives operating 
in the Eastern Province of Rwanda, only 31 (77.5 %) farmers’ rice cooperatives were included in 
the analysis29. These cooperatives are located within the seven administrative districts of the 
Eastern Province, and they produce rice on a total area of 4 194.24 hectares. In each of the 
cooperatives, the cooperative’s agronomist and five key informant farmers were consulted 
through a focus group interview. These interviews were conducted by means of a questionnaire. 
The respondents were requested to interactively identify production and cost data for an assumed 
representative (typical) farm in their cooperative (see Appendix A for the farm survey 
questionnaire). 
Freight on board international export prices, given as FOB, for the major rice exporter to Rwanda 
and globally were used as estimates of the social price of rice. These prices were obtained from 
the online Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) database.30 The transportation, insurance, 
and other costs incurred for the transportation of rice from exporting countries31 to Rwanda were 
gathered from the transportation company Bolloré Africa Logistics and informal interviews with 
commodity traders. The market exchange rate that was used to convert these prices from foreign 
                                                 
29
 This incomplete coverage was due to the unavailability of the cooperatives’ management and the time constraint of 
the field work period.    
30
 http://www.fao.org/economic/est/publications/rice-publications/the-fao-rice-price-update/en/.  
31
 Where the FOB prices are recorded.  
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currency to domestic currency was obtained from the National Bank of Rwanda’s online 
database32. 
The domestic transportation and marketing costs needed to be adjusted for these world prices to 
be comparable with farm gate prices. These include handling and storage costs at Rwanda 
Bonded Warehouses33, which were collected by means of an informal interview with an 
employee at this company. The domestic transportation and other marketing costs incurred along 
the chain were obtained through informal interviews with a selection of domestic truck drivers, 
milling plant personnel, as well as through a farm survey. 
The direct transfer payments (i.e. taxes, subsidies, and import tariffs) needed to adjust the private 
prices of tradable inputs to their respective social values were sourced from the Rwanda Revenue 
Authority (RRA) and Market Access Map34, specifically applied taxes and tariff rates. The data 
on applied direct subsidies were gathered with a farm survey. 
Table 4-1, below, summarizes the main variables used for the purpose of this study. These are 
separated into two categories, namely quantity measures and price measures. The quantity 
measures consist of the determinants of the quantities (weights and volumes) of all the inputs and 
outputs of a production system. The price measures consist of the determinants of the private and 
social farm gate prices for all the inputs and outputs of the rice production system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 http://www.bnr.rw/ 
33
 The debarkation point of imported goods, prior to and during the customs clearance process. This institution is 
known as ‘Magasin Généraux du Rwanda’ (MAGERWA). 
34
 http://www.macmap.org/. 
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Table 4-1: Research variables 
Domain Category Variable Name Variable definition 
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ex
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Quantity 
measures 
Qty_TradFixedInput__i Quantity of ‘tradable fixed input i’ used 
Qty_NonTradFixedInput__i Quantity of ‘Non-tradable fixed input i’ used 
ShareRiceUse_TradFixedInput_i_% Share (%) of rice production in the total use of the tradable 
fixed input i  
ShareRiceUse_NonTradFixedInput_i_
% 
Share (%) of rice production in the total use of the non-tradable 
fixed input i 
UsefulLife_TradFixedInput_i The useful life of the tradable fixed input i 
UsefulLife_NonTradFixedInput_i The useful life of the non-tradable fixed input i,   
Qty_TradIntermInput_j Quantity of ‘tradable intermediate input j’ used 
Qty_NonTradIntermInput_j Quantity of ‘non-tradable intermediate input j’ used 
Qty_ExtLabour Quantity of external (paid) labour used, 
Qty_FamLabour Quantity of family labour used, 
Price 
measures 
PFGP_TradFixedInput__i Private farm gate price for the tradable fixed input i 
IPP_TradFixedInput__i Import parity price (IPP), comparable at farm level, for the 
tradable fixed input i 
PFGP_NonTradFixedInput__i Private farm gate price for the non-tradable fixed input i 
OC_NonTradFixedInput__i Opportunity cost for the non-tradable fixed input i 
PFGP_TradIntermInput_j Private farm gate price for the tradable intermediate input j 
IPP_TradIntermInput__j Import parity price, comparable at farm level, for the tradable 
intermediate input i 
PFGP_NonTradIntermInput__j Private farm gate price for the non-tradable intermediate input j 
OC_NonTradIntermInput__j Opportunity cost for the non-tradable intermediate input input j 
Wage_ExtLabour Labour wage 
OC_ExtLabour Opportunity cost of external labour 
OC_FamLabour Opportunity cost of family labour 
D
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a
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en
u
e Quantity 
measure 
Qty_PaddyRice The most likely quantity of paddy rice harvested  
Price 
measures 
PFGP_PaddyRice Private farm gate price for paddy rice 
IPP_PaddyRice Import parity price, comparable at farm level, for rice 
Note, the letter i stands for fixed inputs such as land, machinery, tools, and other equipment, 
while the letter j represents intermediate inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, etc. 
4.3.2 Construction of the PAM 
The PAM is structured as the product of two accounting identities. The first identity is 
profitability, which is defined as the difference between the revenues and costs35 of a commodity 
production system. This profit measure is calculated in two ways: the first as private profit (D), 
i.e., using private market prices36, and the second as social profit (H), i.e., using social prices37. 
                                                 
35
 These cost data are disaggregated into two components: tradable inputs and domestic factors (non-tradable inputs). 
36
 The private price is the actual market price that farmers or other actors along the chain pay/receive for the 
purchase/sale of the good or service. 
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The second identity of the PAM is divergence, which is the difference between private and social 
profit (L), revenue (I), and costs (J:K), as summarized in Table 4-2, below. 
Table 4-2: Structure of a Policy Analysis Matrix 
PROFIT     REVENUE    COSTS 
 
  
       TRADABLE INPUTS     DOMESTIC FACTORS 
Private prices D = A-(B+C) A = ∑(P
p
x Qx) B = ∑(P
p
i Qi) C = ∑(P
p
j Qj) 
Social prices H = E-(F+G) E = ∑( P
s
x Qx) F = ∑(P
s
i Qi) G = ∑(P
s
j Qj) 
DIVERGENCES L = D-H I =A-E J = B – F K = C - G 
Source: Adapted from Monke and Pearson (1989:11-12); Mahlanza (2001:89) 
In this table; Qx is the quantity of rice produced, Ppx is the private price of rice, Psx is the social 
price of rice, Qi is the quantity of tradable input ith, Ppi is the private price of tradable input ith, Psi 
is the social price of tradable input ith, Qj is the quantity of domestic factor jth, Ppj is the private 
price of domestic factor jth, and Psj is the social price of domestic factor j.  
4.3.2.1 Definition of the PAM parameters 
Private profitability: The first row of the PAM measures private profit (D), which is obtained by 
deducting private costs (B+C) from private revenues (A) (see Table 4-2). This private profit is 
based on the actual (observed) market prices received by farmers and paid by farmers, as well as 
other actors along the chain (Monke & Pearson, 1989:12). Therefore, it is an indicator of the 
competitiveness of the farm system, given the prevailing technology, market prices, and 
government policies (Monke & Pearson, 1989:12; Shapiro & Staal, 1995: 77). 
If private profit is negative (D<0), it implies that the system is unprofitable for private producers 
as it is associated with a negative rate of return (Monke & Pearson, 1989:12). On the other hand, 
a positive private profit (D>0) implies that the system under analysis is profitable for private 
farmers, as it is earning a positive rate of return. The latter system is expected to expand, unless it 
is constrained by the available farm land, or if there are other crop production systems that are 
more profitable (Monke & Pearson, 1989:12-13). 
                                                                                                                                                              
37
 The social (accounting, economic, efficient, or shadow) price is the price that reflects the opportunity cost of a 
resource to society (the nation). Little and Mirrlees (1974:68) describe this price as “a relative measure that shows 
the rate at which real goods and services can be exchanged for each other”. The social prices are more accurate when 
estimating the social benefits and costs of a project for the nation, because market prices are often distorted (UNIDO 
& IDCAS, 1986:21). Lanfranco, Ferraro and Rava (2014:4), and Touré, Groenewald, Seck and Diagne (2013:71) 
highlight that while social prices reflect the scarcity or best alternative use of the resources under consideration 
(technical efficiency), market prices reflect market failure and/or policy induced transfers. 
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Social profitability38: The second row of the PAM measures social profit (H), using social prices. 
The social valuation of goods and services is relatively more complicated than the private 
valuation. While the latter is based on observable market (private) prices, the former is based on 
prices that would exist if markets were competitive and free. When social profit is positive 
(H>0), it is an indicator that the production system has comparative advantage and that the 
system is economically efficient (Basavaraj et al., 2003:33; Mohanty et al., 2003:67). On the 
other hand, a negative social profit (H<0) implies that the system has no comparative advantage 
and that it is economically inefficient39.  
According to Gittinger (1982:251) and Squire and Van der Tak (1975:19), when adjusting private 
values to social values, the first step entails eliminating direct transfer payments from private 
values. These direct transfer payments are defined by Gittinger (1982:251) as “payments that do 
not represent the use of real resources, but only the transfer of claims from one person in the 
society to another”40. The second step entails adjusting private values for price distortions. In this 
case different steps are followed depending on whether the good or service under consideration is 
traded, non-traded (domestic factor) or semi-traded. 
Below follows a brief discussion on the social valuation of tradable goods (i.e. agricultural 
commodities, fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, etc.) 41, non-tradable goods (i.e. bulky goods, highly 
perishable goods, labour, capital, land, electricity, water, marketing and legal activities, etc. )42, 
as well as an adjustment of the foreign exchange rate from market distortions. 
 
 
                                                 
38
 UNIDO and IDCAS (1986:52) use the term ‘commercial profitability’ and ‘national profitability’ to reflect 
respectively private profitability and social profitability. According to UNIDO and IDCAS, (1986:52), while 
commercial profit is measured in monetary terms (based on market prices), national profitability is measured in real 
terms (adjusted market prices to reflect social prices), hence representing the real contribution of the project to 
national welfare (UNIDO and IDCAS, 1986:52). 
39
 It should be noted that production systems with comparative disadvantage can only specialize through government 
support, such as subsidies and import tariffs (Mahlanza, 2001:90). However, protective government policies reduce 
social welfare due to the inefficient allocation of resources. Shapiro and Staal (1995:78) argue that social profit is an 
indicator of the long run viability of a production system, especially when government policy interventions are not 
sustainable.  
40
 These payments include taxes, direct subsidies, interest payments, etc. 
41
 A good is tradable if its domestic production costs are less than its FOB export price, hence it is exported; or if its 
domestic costs of production are greater than its CIF price; hence it is imported (Gittinger 1982:251).  
42
 A product is qualified as non-tradable if the domestic cost of its production is greater than its FOB export price and 
less than its CIF price. (Gittinger 1982:251-253; Monke, Pearson 1989:78). 
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Determination of social prices for tradable goods 
For tradable goods, whether they are domestically produced or imported, the corresponding 
world prices are used as proxies to reflect their social prices (Monke & Pearson 1989:68; Shapiro 
& Stall 1995:78). Little and Mirrlees (1974:68) argue that as long as the production of a good 
affects its exportation/importation, its border price should be used in place of its accounting 
(social) price, because the border price reflects the real opportunity cost/benefit of its production 
or use. These world prices are the cost insurance freight (CIF) and free on board (FOB) prices for 
imported and exported goods/services respectively (Mohanty et al., 2003:69; Monke & Pearson, 
1989:13; Squire & Van der Tak, 1975:31-32).  
The world prices are then adjusted to allow for the transportation and marketing costs between 
the point of import/export and the farm gate to be comparable at the farm level (Mohanty et al., 
2003:69; Monke & Pearson, 1989:13). No import duties or other taxes should be added to these 
border prices (Squire & Van der Tak, 1975:32). However, Monke and Pearson (1989:138) 
pointed out that when there is a lack of information on world prices, but information is available 
on policy transfers, one can estimate social prices for tradable goods by removing the effects of 
policy transfers from their domestic market prices. 
In this study, the social price for paddy rice is estimated by adjusting the international FOB rice 
export price from the primary exporter (Pakistan) of rice to Rwanda, with transport and 
marketing costs to be comparable at each marshland, for each cooperative.43 The social prices for 
tradable inputs are estimated by eliminating direct transfer payment subsidies, value added tax 
(VAT), and import tariffs from their respective private values. 
Table 4-3, below, summarizes the weighted average social IPP comparable at farm level across 
all the cooperatives under the scope of the study.44 The weighted average social IPP, comparable 
at the farm gate, was USD 252.82/MT in 2014. This IPP is 23.63 % lower than the estimated 
prevailing farm gate price of USD 331.04/MT. 
 
                                                 
43
 Refer to Appendix B for the domestic marketing costs along each cooperative’s rice value chain 
44
 Transport and marketing costs along each cooperative’s rice value chain were weighted based on the share of each 
cooperative in total paddy rice produced by all sampled cooperatives, during agricultural season 2014A, as specified 
in Appendix C. The price margins between farms and milling plants gates were used as a proxy for representing all 
transportation and marketing (processing, packaging, etc.) costs incurred between these two stages. 
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Table 4-3: Estimation of the social import parity price for rice comparable at farm gate 
Stage/Steps Amount 
FOB Pakistan rice (25 % broken) (USD/MT) 392.00 
   + Freight cost. Karachi port to Kigali/Rwanda
45
 (USD/MT), 18 MT container 175.00 
   + Insurance cost (0.5 % of CIF) 2.85 
CIF at Kigali/Rwanda Bonded Warehouses (MAGERWA) (USD/MT) 569.85 
    * Official exchange rate (Frw/USD) 684.42 
CIF at Rwanda Bonded Warehouses (Frw/MT) 390016.22 
   + Handling cost (Unloading, reloading, etc.) (Frw/MT), 10 Frw/kg  10000.00 
   + Parking fees (Frw/ton), 18 ton container, Frw 10 000 lump sum 555.56 
   + Storage cost (Frw/ton), 1 Frw/day (the first 3 days are free of charge)
46
 2000.00 
IPP  at Rwanda Bonded Warehouses' exit gate (Frw/MT) 402571.78 
  + Transport cost to rice wholesale market (Frw/ton), 15 ton container 16883.24 
IPP at wholesale market (Frw/MT) 419455 
  - Transport cost milling plant to wholesale market (Frw/MT) 3787.3 
  - Loading cost (Frw/MT) 2000 
IPP at milling plant gate, (Frw/MT) 413667.7 
     * Conversion factor (Paddy rice to Milled rice) 0.65 
IPP (Paddy rice equivalent) at milling plant gate, (Frw/MT) 268884 
   Price margin between farm and milling plant gate
47
 55% 
  / (1+Marketing margin) 
 IPP at farm gate level (Frw/MT) 172991.84 
IPP at farm gate level (USD/MT) 252.82 
Source: Compiled based on author’s farm survey findings; Bahati (2014); BNR (2014b); Bolloré Africa logistics 
(2014); Bwimba (2014); Fao Rice Price Update (2014);  Murangira (2014); CORIMI (2014); Mukaparadi (2014); 
Itegeri (2014); Mutsindashyaka (2014); Ndayizeye (2014); Basabira (2014); Nkubiri (2014); Seyanga (2014) 
If the 52.4% rice import tariff48, which was prevalent in 2014, could have been included in the 
estimation of the IPP; this IPP could have been USD 348.82/MT (See IPP estimation in 
Appendix D). This IPP would be 5.4% higher than the survey’s estimated private farm gate price.  
The social prices of farming tools (excluding the winnower and basket) were obtained by 
eliminating direct transfer payments of a 10 % import tariff and 18% VAT from their domestic 
market prices. The private prices for the fertilizers NPK and UREA were also adjusted to social 
prices by eliminating the Frw 105/kg (USD 0.15/kg) direct price subsidy received by famers in 
                                                 
45
 The distance between Karachi port to Rwanda Bonded warehouses is estimated at 4453.58 km (2404.7 nautical 
miles) from Karachi port to Mombasa/Kenya port using the sea way, and then 1435 km from Mombasa port to 
Kigali, using road (Google Map, 2014; Sea Distances, 2015). 
46
 We assumed an arbitrary 5 days for imported rice stored in Rwanda Bonded Warehouses, during commodity 
customs declaration. 
47
 The average paddy rice farm gate price and milled rice price (at milling plant gate) were estimated respectively at 
Frw 226.6/kg (USD 0.33/Kg) and Frw 541.13/kg (USD 0.79/Kg). The paddy rice to milled rice conversion factor is 
0.65. 
48Due the EAC Common External Tariff, all import tariffs are applied on the CIF of goods valued at the first point of 
entry in the EAC region; which is usually Mombasa/Kenya port for goods that are imported by Rwanda.  
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30 cooperatives.49 On the other hand, the market prices for pesticides and seeds were used 
without any adjustment in the social analysis without any adjustment, since they were exempted 
of taxes and subsidies. 
Determination of social prices for domestic factors (non-tradable goods)  
Domestic factors do not have corresponding world prices, because they are traded domestically, 
and are therefore assumed to be immobile across borders (Monke & Pearson, 1989:84). 
According to Gittinger (1982:254), if the domestic market for a non-tradable good is thought to 
be relatively competitive, its market price will reflect its marginal cost (opportunity cost). In this 
case, the market price can be used in social analysis.  
However, if there are distortions in the factor markets, the factor market price will have to be 
adjusted for price distortions. The social price (opportunity cost) will be estimated as the income 
forgone by not allocating the domestic factor in the next best alternative use. In this study, there 
are two main domestic factors used in rice production in Rwanda, namely unskilled labour and 
land. 
• Unskilled labour social valuation 
The social value (opportunity cost) of labour is measured as the marginal product of labour 
forgone elsewhere by using this labour in the project under consideration (Squire & Van der Tak, 
1975:29). According to Gittinger (1982:258), where labour markets are perfectly competitive, the 
market wage is a good indicator of the marginal product of labour. When demand is high, during 
peak seasons (i.e. planting and harvesting periods), the labour wage rate is a good indicator of the 
opportunity cost of labour, since the labour market structure is competitive (Gittinger, 1982:258). 
However, during off-peak seasons, when labour supply is high, the marginal product of labour is 
close to zero, zero or negative50 (Gittinger, 1982:258-259, Lewis, 1994:60). Though the market 
wage would naturally reflect this low marginal product, the former is often artificially kept higher 
due to social pressure and other traditional practices of paying an acceptable wage (Gittinger, 
1982:258-259; Weckstein, 1972:484). Therefore, the labour market wage, during off-peak 
                                                 
49
 For farming tools, social prices were obtained by multiplying the market price for each tool with the reciprocal of 
1 plus the summation of the tariff and VAT rates expressed in decimal terms; and for fertilizers, social prices were 
obtained by summing up the Frw 105 (USD 0.15) to the price of 1 Kg of each subsidized fertilizer. 
50
 Due to higher unemployment prevailing during slack seasons, if one labourer within the community were to be 
taken away to be used in a new project, the output forgone would be little or nothing. 
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seasons, is not a good indicator of the opportunity cost of labour used in off-peak seasons; hence, 
it needs to be adjusted to reflect the opportunity cost of labour. 
Therefore, the social price of labour is estimated as the weighted average of the peak-season 
wage and the off-peak-season wage. This approach is recommended by Yao (1993, cited by the 
Office of the Sustainable Development Bureau for Africa,1999:11). 
In this study, the average hourly off-peak-season wage, of Frw 83.16 (USD 0.12), was less than 
the average hourly peak-season wage51, of Frw 139.23 (USD 0.20), and even less than the 
minimum wage, of Frw 100 (USD 0.15) per hour, as specified in the 1973 Rwandan labour law.52 
In short, the market wage was adjusting to market conditions. However, since the market wage is 
assumed to be higher than the marginal product of labour during off-peak seasons, in this study, it 
is assumed that the social price of labour during slack seasons was 75% of the prevailing labour 
wage. This proportion is higher than the 50 % assumed by the Office of the Sustainable 
Development Bureau for Africa (1999); Dunmola, Omobowale and Iyabo (2015); Ogbe, 
Okoluwa and Saka (2011); and Nguyen and Heidhues (2004).  
Briefly, the social price (shadow wage) of labour is estimated using the formula: 
) =
*+,-./0	*1
2
            (4-5) 
Source: Adapted from the Office of the Sustainable Development Bureau for Africa (1999:11 
cited Yao, 1993) 
Where SPL is the social price of labour, WP is the peak-season labour wage and W0 is the off-
peak-season labour wage. 
The shadow wage was consequently estimated at Frw 100.8 (USD 0.15), and was used to valuate 
hired and family labor used. It should be noted that during sensitivity analysis, the market wage is 
                                                 
51
 The hourly market labour wage during the peak season was estimated as the weighted average of the ratio of the 
total remuneration of hired labour over total quantity of hired labour used during farming activities that take place 
during the general period of planting and harvesting. The activities that take place during the general period of 
planting are land preparation, seedbed preparation, seedbed follow-up, ploughing and puddling, transplanting and 
planting, and applying NPK fertilizer. The activities that take place during the general period of harvesting are 
harvesting, transporting the rice panicles to drying facilities, threshing, winnowing and packaging. Likewise, the 
hourly market wage during the off-peak season was estimated in the same way, except for the farming activities, first 
weeding, first Urea fertilizer application, first pesticide application, second weeding, second Urea application, 
second pesticide application, third weeding, third pesticide application, fourth weeding, water channelling and bird 
scaring. 
52
 Refer to The New Times Rwanda (2015) for the minimum labour wage 
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also used as a proxy for the social value of unskilled labor to assess what could have been the 
results if the labor wage was not distorted. 
• Land social valuation 
The social valuation of land consists of estimating the opportunity of using land, which depends 
on available alternative uses of land (Ahmed, 1983:73). Gittinger (1983:256) defines this 
opportunity cost as the “the value of production forgone when the use of the land is changed from 
its without-project use to its with-project use”.  
The opportunity cost of land is mostly estimated as the net return to land, computed based on the 
net profitability of the best alternative crop (or competing crops)53. It is also estimated as the 
amount that other land users, besides those in the production system under analysis, are willing to 
pay for the land (Little & Mirrlees, 1974:222-223). Furthermore, where the land rental market is 
thought to be competitive, the land rental value can be used as a proxy of the social value of land 
(Gittinger 1982:257). 
Due to enforced government regulations, rice is the only crop produced in marshlands, by the 
cooperatives. However, in 2002 (before the issuing of the Rwandan land policy that transferred 
marshland ownership from individuals to the state), a rice marketing survey conducted in 
Rwanda by Jagwe et al. (2003:20) estimated the marshland rental per season at Frw 12500/ha 
(USD 18.26/ha). This rental value is assumed to reflect the opportunity cost of land during that 
time. It is consequently compounded with a 10.71% interest rate54 to derive its equivalent in 
2014.  
The following forward price formula is therefore used to estimate the future value of the 2002 
marshland rental:  
34 = 4567           (4-6) 
Source: Hull (2002:46) 
                                                 
53
 Some of the studies that have used this approach are Mohanty, Fang and Chaudhary (2003:69); Yao (1997:215); 
Fang and Beghin, (2000). This net return to land can be estimated by subtracting all farm production costs (external 
labour and family labour allowances as well as capital interest included) from the value of the farm output, all valued 
at market prices (Gittinger, 1982:258) 
54
 The 2014 Rwandan discount rate, as specified in BNR (2015), was used for compounding purposes. 
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Where Fo is the forward marshland rental value for 2014; So is the marshland rental value in 
2002; e is the exponential function; r is the risk free interest rate; and T is the elapsed time, in 
years, between 2002 and 2014. 
The land social value was, consequently, Frw 50290.27/ha (USD 73.48/ha). It is 137.9 % higher 
than the estimated average actual rental value paid by farmers to the local government. This 
estimated value is used as a proxy for the social value of marshland for the year 2014, and 
generalized for the Eastern Province of Rwanda. 
• Other domestic factors  
The market prices for the non-tradable inputs winnower and basket were assumed to reflect their 
respective social opportunity costs; hence they were used in social analysis. Furthermore, though 
in few (three) cooperatives, where compost is used, farmers use their own manure produced, in 
the social analysis, compost was valued at the market price at which users other than rice farmers 
purchased compost. The market price of compost was Frw 20/kg (USD 0.03/kg), at the time of 
the survey, and was also assumed to reflect the opportunity cost of compost 
Social valuation of semi tradable inputs 
Intermediate inputs that were identified in this study include farmers’ contributions to 
cooperatives for paying for different services received from the cooperative. The private value of 
these services was used in the social analysis without any adjustment. 
Adjusting private values for distortions in the foreign exchange market 
According to Gittinger (1982:247), due to distorting trade policies, such as import tariffs and 
export subsidies, there is a premium paid on tradable goods over non-tradable goods. This 
premium causes tradable goods to appear relatively cheaper and domestic goods/services 
relatively more expensive. It reflects the additional amount domestic consumers are willing to 
pay to acquire one additional unit of tradable goods (Gittinger, 1982:247). When the prices of 
non-tradable goods are converted to domestic currency, using the prevailing foreign exchange 
rate, this premium is not properly reflected.  
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Gittinger (1982:247) states that there are two important approaches that are used to adjust the 
foreign exchange rate from the foreign exchange premium55. The first approach is to generate the 
shadow exchange rate (SER), which is estimated by multiplying the official foreign exchange 
rate (OER) by 1 plus the foreign exchange premium (FEP). This SER is then used to convert the 
price of tradable goods to domestic currency, in place of the OER. The following equation (4-7) 
shows how the SER is estimated: 
8 = 98 ∗ (1 + 38)                 (4-7) 
Adapted from Gittinger (1982:249) and Squire and Van der Tak (1975:93) 
The second approach, which is used in the present study56, consists of using a standard 
conversion factor (SCF). The conversion factor approach entails “reducing the domestic currency 
value of non-tradable items by an amount sufficient to reflect the premium” (Gittinger, 
1982:247). In a social analysis, the SCF is used to adjust the private cost of each domestic factor 
(non-tradable input) in order to eliminate the effect of distortions in the foreign exchange market 
(Gittinger, 1982:248). 
According to Squire and Van der Tak (1975:35), in some cases, a conversion factor is estimated 
for each group of related non-tradable goods, and in other cases, one conversion factor is used for 
all non-tradable goods. The SCF is estimated as the ratio of the exports and imports value, 
expressed in border prices, to their respective value, expressed in domestic currency (Squire & 
Van der Tak, 1975:93). It can also be estimated as the reciprocal of 1 plus the foreign exchange 
premium rate (expressed in decimal terms) (Gittinger, 1982:249). Equation (4-8) illustrates how 
the SCF is estimated:  
3 = 	 ;
;,<=
														3 = >=
"=
       (4-8) 
Adapted from Gittinger (1982:249) and Squire and Van der Tak (1975:93) 
The foreign exchange premium (FEP) for Rwanda was estimated by Kuo, Salci and Jenkins 
(2014:281) at 5.37 %. In other words, the shadow exchange rate for Rwanda is 5.37 % higher 
than the market exchange rate. Consequently, based on this exchange rate premium, in social 
                                                 
55
 Kuo, Salci and Jenkins (2014:269) define the foreign exchange premium as the “proportion by which the 
economic value of the foreign exchange exceeds the market exchange rate of that country” (Kuo, Salci & Jenkins, 
2014:269). 
56
 The results may not have been reliable if the SER approach was used, because tradable input social prices were 
estimated indirectly based on their respective domestic prices, and not directly based on corresponding world prices.  
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analysis, private values were adjusted from distortions in the foreign exchange market by 
multiplying the cost of each domestic factor (non-tradable input) by a standard conversion factor 
(SCF) of 0.949. 
Net transfers (divergences): The second identity of the PAM matrix (the third row of the PAM) 
measures net policy transfers (L), which are obtained by deducting social profit (H) from private 
profit (D). Here, (L) is a measure of the extent to which distorting policies and market failures 
affect the production system’s efficiency (Monke & Pearson, 1989:14). If social profit diverges 
from private profit, it suggests that resources are used inefficiently.  
A positive net policy transfer (L > 0) indicates that the system is positively protected, as there are 
incentives that are provided for the production of the commodity. On the other hand, a negative 
net transfer implies that there are disincentives that restrain producers from producing that 
specific commodity. 
Besides the private, social, and divergence estimates, the PAM generates additional ratio 
indicators of competitiveness, comparative advantage, and efficiency, as highlighted in Monke 
and Pearson (1989:16-18); Basavaraj et al. (2013:34); Ellis (1992:57-59); Khai and Yabe 
(2013:164-165); and Stoforos, Kavcic, Erjavec and Mergos (2000:94-96). These ratio indicators 
are the: 
• Private cost ratio (PCR), where PCR = C/(A-B), which is an indicator of 
competitiveness, 
• Domestic resource cost ratio (DRC), where DRC = G/(E-F), which is an indicator of 
comparative advantage and economic efficiency, 
• Effective protection coefficient (EPC), where EPC = (A-B)/(E-F), which is an indicator 
of inefficiencies within both tradable outputs and inputs markets, 
• Nominal protection coefficient in outputs (NPCO), where NPCO = A/E, which is an 
indicator of inefficiencies within tradable output market, 
• Nominal protection coefficient in tradable inputs (NPCI), where NPCI = B/F, which is an 
indicator of inefficiencies within tradable inputs markets, 
• Subsidy ratio to producer (SRP), where SRP = L/E = (D-H)/E, which is also an indicator 
of the level of inefficiencies within the production system.  
Below is a brief description of each ratio. 
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4.3.2.2 Definition of the PAM ratio indicators 
The private cost ratio (PCR) is the ratio of domestic factor private costs (C) over the ‘value 
added in private prices' (A-B)57, or  = /(% −  ). This indicator shows the ability of the 
system to pay for domestic factors and still remain competitive. It is an indicator of the viability 
of the system under prevailing market conditions and government intervention. A PCR>1 is an 
indicator of private loss or competitive disadvantage, while a PRC < 1 is an indicator of private 
profit or competitiveness.  
The domestic resource cost ratio (DRC), as discussed above, is the ratio of domestic factor 
social costs (G) over the value added in social prices (E-F)58, or  = ?/(8 − 3). This ratio 
measures the economic efficiency or comparative advantage of the system. A DRC>1 is an 
indicator of economic inefficiency or comparative disadvantage, as it costs more in domestic 
currency to produce one unit of the commodity than to import it. A DRC<1 is an indicator of 
economic efficiency or comparative advantage. In short, production systems contribute to social 
welfare by generating social revenue that outweighs domestic factor social costs. 
The effective protection coefficient (EPC) is the ratio of the value added in private prices (A-B) 
over the value added in social prices (E-F), or 8 = (% −  )/(8 − 3). This ratio measures the 
degree of transfers as induced by both output and tradable input policies. An EPC>1 is an 
indicator that there are distorting policies, such as import tariffs, import quotas, and input 
subsidies, that create incentives for the production of that commodity. An EPC<1 is an indicator 
that there are distorting policies that increase the cost of tradable inputs, therefore creating 
disincentives for the production of the commodity. 
 The nominal protection coefficient for tradable output (NPCO) is the ratio of private revenue 
(A) over social revenue (E), or	9 = %/8. This ratio measures prevailing incentives and 
disincentives for the production of the commodity, as induced by government policies in output 
markets. An NPCO > 1 implies that producers are positively protected through implicit subsidies, 
since the domestic price for the output is relatively higher than the corresponding parity price. On 
the other hand, an NPCO < 1 implies that there is an implicit tax on output that creates a 
disincentive for the production of the commodity.  
                                                 
57
 The value added in private prices is obtained by subtracting the total private costs for tradable inputs (F) from 
private revenue (E). 
58
 The value added in social prices is obtained by subtracting tradable input social costs (F) from social revenue (E). 
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The Nominal protection coefficient for tradable inputs (NPCI) is the ratio of tradable input 
private costs (B) over tradable input social costs (F), or	@ =  /3. This ratio measures 
prevailing incentives and disincentives for the production of a specific commodity, as induced by 
government policies in tradable input markets. A NPCI>1 implies that tradable inputs are taxed. 
In this case, the domestic prices for tradable inputs are relatively higher than corresponding parity 
prices. On the other hand, an NPCI<1 implies that tradable inputs are subsidized. 
The subsidy ratio to producers (SRP), or  = A/8.,  is equal to net transfers (L) divided by 
social revenue (E). It is interpreted as the “proportion of total social revenues in world prices that 
would be required if a single subsidy or tax were substituted for the entire set of commodity and 
macroeconomic policies” (Monke & Pearson, 1989:18). 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter focuses on illustrating the methodology used to address the research questions. 
Among the various other measures of comparative advantage, as explained in section 4.2, the 
PAM is selected. Section 4.3 covers the research methodology used. In subsection 4.3.1, the 
scope of the study is given, among others, stating that there are 31 rice farmers’ cooperatives 
operating in the Eastern Province of Rwanda. The data collection methods comprised a farm 
survey, informal interviews with different players within the rice subsector, and consultation of 
secondary sources of data. The last subsection (4.3.2) illustrates that the PAM uses farm budget 
data (revenue and expenditure), firstly expressed in private prices and secondly in social prices. 
Through a comparison of private and social values, the PAM generates different parameters, 
which are used to estimate different indicators of comparative advantage, competitiveness, and 
efficiency.  
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Chapter 5 Presentation and interpretation of the results 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the results of the study are presented and discussed. Section 5.2 sets out a 
descriptive analysis of the key variables used in the construction of the PAM.59 Section 5.3 is 
about estimating how input costs were disaggregated into tradable and non-tradable components, 
while the last section (5.4) presents and interprets the PAMs results.  
5.2 Descriptive analysis 
5.2.1 Characteristics of farmers’ cooperatives 
This study conducted a survey on 31 rice farmers ‘cooperatives, consisting of 22580 farmers, 
distributed across all the seven districts of the Eastern Province of Rwanda. These cooperatives 
cultivated rice on a total farming area of 4 187 ha.  
Table 5-1: Total area cultivated disaggregated by cooperatives  
Districts Number of cooperatives Farming Area (ha) Number  of farmers 
Gatsibo 2 1280 5820 
Nyagatare 4 812 2292 
Kirehe 5 762 4925 
Bugesera 9 616 4576 
Ngoma 4 373 2944 
Rwamagana 4 210 1107 
Kayonza 3 135 916 
Total area cultivated 31 4187 22580 
 
In terms of kind distribution, the farming area per cooperative ranged from 8 ha to 900 ha, with 
an average of 135 ha per cooperative. It was distributed and used by farmers, members of these 
cooperatives. On average, each cooperative comprises 728 farmers (see Table 5-2). 
 
 
                                                 
59
 The data for these key variables, excluding for cooperatives characteristics (Section 5.2.1), were weighted based 
on the share of each cooperative in total paddy rice produced by all sampled cooperatives, during agricultural season 
2014A, as specified in Appendix C. 
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Table 5-2: Farming area and cooperative membership 
  N Min Max Mean SD 
Farming area per cooperative (ha) 31 8 900 135 201 
Number of farmers per cooperative 31 131 4300 728 873 
5.2.2 Uses and expenditure on farm inputs 
Based on the survey results, inputs used by farmers in the Eastern Province of Rwanda were 
identified. These inputs consisted of the non-tradable inputs such as land, labour, compost, and 
farming tools (winnower and basket60). Tradable inputs consisted of chemical fertilizers, 
pesticides, seeds, and all of the remaining farm tools, such as, hoe, sprayer, tents, machete, etc.  
Land and farm equipment: The average land rental value paid by farmers to the local 
government was on average USD 30.9/ha each season. Farming equipment comprised of hand 
tools, because agriculture sector in Rwanda comprises mostly of small-scale farming that is 
labour-intensive and little mechanized. The common and most frequently used tools were the 
hand-held hoes, machetes, string, sprayers, sickles, tents, and winnowers. Farmers buy these tools 
mainly from local shops and markets (see Figure 5-1). 
Figure 5-1: Equipment used by rice farmers and its market source 
 
Given the prices at the farm gate, the useful life, and the extent to which each tool is used in rice 
farming; the tools were depreciated on average for each season of rice growing, by USD 
113.9/ha. Of this amount, 51% was allocated to the tradable input tent, which is used in post-
harvesting activities. Pesticide, sprayer, and hoe were ranked 2nd and 3rd with 26% and 7 %, 
respectively.  
                                                 
60
 Due to their bulkiness, winnower and basket are locally produced, and are rarely traded across borders. 
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Figure 5-2: Average expenditure on farm equipment 
 
Intermediate inputs: With regard to the use of intermediate inputs, all cooperatives used NPK 
and UREA (inorganic fertilizers). Organic fertilizer compost was used only in approximately 
10% of the cooperatives61 (see Figure 5-3). All cooperatives stated that they use insecticides. The 
most frequently used insecticide was Cypermethrin, which was used by 30 cooperatives. The 
second, Dimethoate, was used in only 2 cooperatives. Regarding uses of other intermediate 
inputs, 77.4 % of the cooperatives listed fungicides among the intermediate inputs used. The two 
aforementioned fungicides used were Trycyclazole (Beam) and Benomyl (Benlate). No herbicide 
was reported as being used. In terms of packaging, polypropylene bags were used by all 
cooperatives in order to transport rice to milling plants. As illustrated in Figure 5-3, below, the 
primary source for these inputs was through the cooperatives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61
 According to Promar Consulting (2012:65), the main factor explaining the low usage of compost (in rice farming 
in Rwanda) is the inability of farmers to move compost due to the long distance between their homes, where 
livestock is raised, to the marshland areas 
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Figure 5-3: Frequency of use of intermediate inputs disaggregated by source 
 
From the surveys, on average farmers spent USD 367.5/ha on intermediate inputs, each season. 
Of this amount, 78 % was allocated to imported fertilizers NPK and UREA (see Figure 5-4). 
Though these fertilizers accounted for the largest share of total cost of intermediate inputs, their 
prices were subsidized. In 2014, 30 of the 31 cooperatives reported farmers’ received a direct 
price subsidy of USD 0.15/kg for NPK and UREA purchased62. 
Figure 5-4: Expenditure on intermediate inputs 
 
Labour: The average quantity of labour used for each season of growing rice was estimated at 
6589.41 labour hours per hectare. Given that rice production is labour intensive63, 84% of total 
labour was hired, while family labour accounted for only 16% of the total labour.64 Labour 
                                                 
62
 The actual amount that farmers were paying for NPK and UREA was on average USD 0.84 and USD 0.72/kg; 
respectively. 
63
 Rice production requires twice as much labour as the production of other grains and legumes (Barker, Herdt & 
Rose, 1985:123). 
64
 Though most of the major food crops, in Rwanda, are produced at subsistence level; rice is a commercialized food 
crop, as 63 % of paddy produced is sold on the market (MINAGRI, NISR & WFP, 2012:14). The proportion of 
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activities included; bird scaring, which accounts for 30.8% of the total labour hours, followed by 
weeding, 23.8% of total labour hours, and harvesting activities (cutting and transportation of rice 
panicles to cooperatives, drying, and threshing), which accounted for 11.6 % of the total labour 
hours. 
In terms of costs, the farmers surveyed spent an average of USD 831.3/ha on labour, for the 
entire season. Though bird scaring was the most labour intensive activity, based on the total 
quantity of hours spent on this activity, it was ranked in third position relative to total expenditure 
on labour, representing 14.2 % of the total labour cost. Bird scaring was ranked after weeding and 
harvesting activities, which accounted for 36.3 % and 17.1 % of labour cost, respectively. Figure 
5-5, below, illustrates that hired labour for bird scaring is paid relatively lower than labour used 
in other farming activities (i.e. land preparation, plowing, planting, harvesting, etc.).  
Figure 5-5: Labour cost per day, in USD 
 
Note: Farming activities seedbed follow-up and preparation, pesticides and fertilizer application, 
water channeling, drying, winnowing, and packaging are mainly conducted by unpaid family 
labour. 
                                                                                                                                                              
harvest that is sold on the market for the major food crops beans, sweet potatoes, maize, cooking banana, Irish 
potatoes, cassava and sorghum is 12%, 11%, 22%, 30%, 32%, 23%, and 54%; respectively  (MINAGRI, NISR & 
WFP, 2012:14). 
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As part of the farming expenditure, there were also contributions paid by farmers to their 
respective cooperatives. These contributions aimed at contributing to the development of 
farmers’ cooperatives, and at paying for the different services rendered by the cooperative to 
farmers. The average amount for these contributions was estimated at Frw 14819.2/ha (USD 
21.7/ha). 65 
5.2.3 Rice yield and prices 
Farmers were additionally requested to estimate the most likely quantity of paddy rice that would 
be harvested under normal weather conditions, from the prototypical farm. The average yield was 
estimated at 6.05 MT/ha. In terms of producer prices, Table 5-3, below, shows that the price paid 
by milling plants to the farmer, at the time that the data was collected, was on average USD 
356.46/MT. Of this amount, cooperatives deducted an average amount of USD 25.42/MT for 
covering marketing costs and other activities incurred by the cooperative, the union of 
cooperatives, and the federation. The farmer was left with an average farm gate price of USD 
331.04/MT. 
Table 5-3: Paddy rice yield and farm gate price 
  Unit Quantity/Amount 
Yield MT/Ha 6.05 
Paddy price (As paid by the milling plant) Frw/MT 243968.72 
 
USD/MT 356.46 
Deductible by cooperative (for marketing costs) Frw/MT 17399.42 
 
USD/MT 25.42 
Farm gate price Frw/MT 226569.30 
 
USD/MT 331.04 
Source: Survey findings 
5.3 Disaggregation of inputs into tradable and non-tradable components: 
It is a prerequisite to disaggregate input costs into tradable and non-tradable components in order 
to construct the PAM. Monke and Pearson (1989:105) recognized the difficulty in disaggregating 
precisely input costs to their respective tradable and non-tradable components. Where there is a 
lack of information, the authors recommend that the input be classified to its primary category.   
                                                 
65
 These farmers’ contributions of Frw 14819.2/ha do not include the amount deducted by the cooperative (per each 1 
Kg of paddy rice sold by the farmer) for marketing activities incurred by the cooperative. These marketing costs 
were deducted from the price paid by the milling plant to the farmer (for paddy rice delivered) during the estimation 
of the farm gate price. (Refer to rice yield and prices section 5.2.3)  
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Table 5-4, below, shows that the market prices for fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, and hand tools 
were consequently considered as wholly tradable (i.e. 100 % of these costs fall into the tradable 
component of the PAM (Refer to equation B, in Table 4.2); and those for labour, land lease, 
compost, winnower, and basket treated as wholly non-tradable. 
Table 5-4: Disaggregation of input costs into tradable and domestic factor components 
Item Tradable component (%) Domestic factor component (%) 
Fertilizer 100% 0% 
Compost 0% 100% 
Pesticide 100% 0% 
Hand tools (winnower and basket excluded) 100% 0% 
Inputs transport costs 33.33% 66.67% 
Winnower and basket 0% 100% 
Labour 0% 100% 
Land rental 0% 100% 
Farmers ‘contributions to cooperative 33.33% 66.67% 
 
However, farmers’ contributions and input transport costs were disaggregated into two-thirds 
non-tradable and one-third tradable (see Table 5-4, above). This approach is recommended by 
Monke and Pearson (1989:106), when dealing with semi-tradable goods, for which it is difficult 
to identity the primary category. 
5.4 Presentation and interpretation of the PAMs 
Prior to illustrating the PAM results, the net farm income, estimated using both private and social 
prices, is presented in Table 5-5. The revenue and expenditures are for all farms, within the 
sampled cooperatives. 
On average, rice production private costs averaged USD 1365.2/ha in the Eastern Province of 
Rwanda. The domestic factor labour accounted for the largest share of total farm production 
costs, at 60.89 %. Imported chemical fertilizers and farm tools (mostly imported) were ranked at 
the 2nd and 3rd positions respectively, with 21.08 % and 8.34 % of total farm production costs. 
Land rental accounted only for 2.26 % of these costs.66 It is clear from Table 5-5, below, that rice 
                                                 
66
 These results are not far different from Kathiresan (2013:23,24)’s findings, where total rice production cost in 
Rwanda was estimated at Frw 1’017’510/ha (USD 1’569.8/ha), of which 52 % was allocated to labour. 
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production was both financially and economically profitable. However, the financial profit was 
much higher than economic profit. 
Table 5-5: Farm revenue and expenditures67, USD/ha 
Item  Financial (private) Economic (social) 
I. Farm revenue 2007.3 1535.9 
II. Variable costs 
  
           Labour 831.3 913.2 
                   Family labour 0.0 150.2 
                   External Labour 831.3 763.0 
          Seeds 22.1 22.1 
         Compost 0.0 4.6 
         Chemical fertilizers 287.8 338.6 
                  NPK  158.0 183.8 
                  UREA 129.8 154.8 
         Pesticides 32.3 32.3 
                 Cypermethrin  16.2 16.2 
                 Dimethoate  0.2 0.2 
                 Trycyclazole/Beam  15.8 15.8 
                 Benomyl/Benlate  0.1 0.1 
         Other variable costs 25.3 19.8 
     Total variable costs 1198.8 1330.5 
Gross margin 808.5 205.3 
V. Overhead costs   
         Land rental 30.9 69.7 
         Contributions to cooperatives 21.7 20.9 
         Farm tools depreciation 113.8 89.9 
    Total overhead costs 166.4 180.5 
Total production costs 1365.1 1511.1 
V. Net farm revenue (Net Farm profit) 642.1 24.8 
 
5.4.1 PAMs results 
As summarized in the PAM below (Table 5-6), on the farmers’ perspective, rice farming was 
profitable in the Eastern Province of Rwanda. This profitability was indicated by a net private 
farm profit of Frw 439478.4/Ha (USD 642.1 US$/ha). On the other hand, the social analysis 
shows that by taking into consideration the opportunity cost for all farm inputs and outputs, rice 
production generated an Frw 16964.1/ha (USD 24.8/ha) of net social profit (see Table 5-6). In 
other words, the Eastern Province of Rwanda has a comparative advantage in rice. It is 
economically efficient to allocate resources for rice production in this province. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
67
 Refer to Appendix E for more details on the weighted averages for expenditure on inputs and farm revenues across 
the sampled cooperatives.  
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The divergence between the net farm profit and net social profit, of Frw 422514.3 (USD 617.3), 
indicates a positive net policy transfer. In other words, the rice subsector is protected as the 
existing government policies provided an incentive for rice production.   
A detail analysis of the sources of market distortions showed that both output and input markets 
were distorted. For instance, the private farm revenue was greater than social farm revenue, as 
indicated by a positive output transfer of Frw 322637.0/ha (USD 471.4). This positive output 
transfer suggests that there were subsidies paid to farmers for paddy rice sold.  
In addition, the private farm costs of tradable inputs were less than the corresponding social farm 
costs by Frw 14846.3 (USD 21.7), due to the subsidization of tradable inputs. The domestic 
factor markets were also distorted, as revealed by a negative factor transfer of Frw 85031.1 (USD 
124.2). This factor transfer was the combined effect of the subsidization of land rental price, a 
distorted labour wage, and the use of family labour (refer to the farm budget above, Table 5-5). 
On average, all distorting policies and market failures raised private profit above social profit by 
Frw 422514.3/Ha (USD 617.3/ha). Of this amount, 76 % was derived from implicit subsidies in 
output markets, 20 % was from distortions in domestic factor markets, while distortions in 
tradable input markets accounted for 4 %. Briefly, inefficiencies, within the rice subsector, arose 
mainly from commodity markets. 
Table 5-6: The Policy Analysis Matrix for rice production in the Eastern Province of 
Rwanda 
PROFIT     REVENUE    COSTS 
 
  
       TRADABLE INPUTS     DOMESTIC FACTORS 
  Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD 
Private prices 439 478.4 642.1 1 373 814.0 2 007.3 328 701.8 480.3 605 633.9 884.9 
Social prices 16 964.1 24.8 1 051 177.0 1 535.9 343 548.0 502.0 690 664.9 1 009.1 
DIVERGENCES 422 514.3 617.3 322 637.0 471.4 -14 846.3 -21.7 -85 031.1 -124.2 
Source: Research findings 
The ratio indicators of competitiveness, comparative advantage, and market distortions are 
summarized in Table 5-7, below: 
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Table 5-7: PAM indicators, disaggregated per cooperative 
 
Name of the cooperative PCR DRC NPCO NPCI EPC SRP 
1 Coricya 0.67 1.06 1.34 0.88 1.60 0.38 
2 Cocuricyi 0.50 0.89 1.34 0.87 1.54 0.47 
3 Cocuribu 0.74 1.29 1.34 0.89 1.60 0.45 
4 Cocuriga 1.05 2.34 1.34 0.91 1.81 0.60 
5 Cocurire 0.91 2.88 1.34 0.95 1.87 0.87 
6 Coperig 0.62 1.21 1.34 0.93 1.64 0.48 
7 Coprimwa 0.26 1.13 1.34 0.89 1.62 0.82 
8 Cocurigi 0.82 1.53 1.34 0.91 1.60 0.51 
9 Coproriz 0.61 0.98 1.30 0.96 1.41 0.40 
10 Corimak 0.61 0.95 1.30 0.96 1.44 0.36 
11 Coprorika 0.73 1.57 1.32 0.96 1.69 0.50 
12 Codervam 0.49 0.89 1.32 0.94 1.52 0.43 
13 Corvny 0.51 0.91 1.32 0.93 1.57 0.41 
14 Corinyaburiba 0.67 1.28 1.32 0.95 1.49 0.53 
15 Twizamure 0.88 1.98 1.32 0.95 1.63 0.63 
16 Inkingi y'ubuhinzi 0.61 1.67 1.32 1.05 1.49 0.75 
17 Jyambere nyarugenge 0.77 1.56 1.32 1.00 1.65 0.46 
18 Koterwa 0.54 1.29 1.32 0.98 1.52 0.61 
19 Korivarwi 0.50 1.01 1.32 0.97 1.52 0.49 
20 Copauki 0.83 1.50 1.32 0.99 1.53 0.46 
21 Copriki cyunuzi 0.58 0.83 1.27 0.93 1.42 0.29 
22 Isabane 0.81 1.28 1.27 0.99 1.46 0.33 
23 Mushikiri rice growers 0.67 0.92 1.27 0.95 1.40 0.27 
24 Kijumbura rice growers 0.76 1.15 1.27 0.99 1.40 0.33 
25 Corimu 0.74 1.72 1.27 1.02 1.50 0.58 
26 Cocuriru 0.55 0.91 1.34 0.96 1.50 0.41 
27 Corimaru 0.53 0.76 1.32 1.04 1.46 0.30 
28 Kopetwiteki 0.85 1.41 1.32 0.93 1.61 0.37 
29 Cocurivam 0.71 1.27 1.34 0.91 1.62 0.45 
30 Corimi 0.27 0.56 1.34 0.97 1.50 0.45 
31 Coprimu 1.05 1.90 1.32 0.95 1.73 0.38 
 
Weighted average (All) 0.58 0.98 1.31 0.96 1.48 0.40 
Source: Research findings 
• The Private Cost ratio, PCR=0.58<1 indicates that under prevailing market conditions, 
rice production in the Eastern Province has the ability to pay for domestic factors and 
remain competitive.  
• The Domestic Resource Cost ratio was estimated at 0.98, meaning that for each 100 Frw 
generated in social value, there was only Frw 98 spent on the domestic factors used, 
valued at their opportunity costs. In other words, the Eastern Province had a comparative 
advantage in rice production, since it cost less domestic currency to produce than would 
have been spent if rice was imported. 
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• The effective protection coefficient, EPC (estimated at 1.48) >1, implying that there was 
in general positive protection over rice production. The government policies created 
incentives for rice production. 
• The nominal protection coefficient for the output market, NPCO (estimated at 1.31) >1, 
suggesting that rice subsector is protected. In other words, the domestic price of rice was 
31% higher than the reference world rice price due to implicit subsidies in the output 
markets. 
• The nominal protection coefficient for the input market, NPCI, was 0.96, suggesting that 
there is a positive protection over domestic rice production, through input subsidization. 
The domestic prices of tradable inputs were on aggregate 4 % lower than corresponding 
world prices68. 
• The subsidy ratio to producers (SRP) was estimated at 0.40, which indicates that if policy 
support and market failure were eliminated, 40 % increase in social farm revenue would 
be required to maintain current farm profit levels. 
PAM indicators: Aggregate versus disaggregated results: 
• Only two cooperatives had a PCR >1. In other words, under prevailing market conditions, 
technology, and government policies, farmers within Cocuriga and Coprimu cooperatives 
operated at a loss and were not competitive. The farm loss was due to poor rice yield69. 
• Although on aggregate the results indicated that the Eastern Province had comparative 
advantage in rice production, when the DRC ratio was calculated at the cooperative level, 
21 of the 31 cooperatives had a DRC>1. In other words, 67.7 % of farmers’ cooperatives 
had comparative disadvantage. 
• The 21 cooperatives, with no comparative advantage, cultivated rice on 25 % of the area 
under study. They were composed by an average of 406.7 farmers per cooperative, 
cultivating rice on a 50.3 ha farm area, with an average farm size per farmer of 0.12 ha. 
• The remaining 10 cooperatives, with DRC<1, i.e. those with comparative advantage, 
cultivated rice on 75% of the total area under study. They were composed by an average 
                                                 
68
 The survey findings showed that farmers were receiving an Frw 105/kg (USD 0.15/kg) direct subsidy on fertilizers 
NPK and UREA purchased. However, this support in tradable inputs, is partly offset by taxation on imported 
farming tools, as it is summarized in the private and social budgets (Table 5-5) 
69
 Farmers in Cocuriga and Coprimu cooperatives had a 4.0 and 4.4 MT/ha yields; respectively, compared to the 
average rice yield of 6.05 MT/ha across sampled cooperatives.  
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of 1403.9 farmers per cooperative, cultivating rice on a 313.8 ha farm area, with an 
average farm size per farmer of 0.22 ha. 
• Based on the previous two points, it is clear that the larger the rice farms, the more 
farmers had comparative advantage and the more they were efficient. 
• Consistent with regional estimate, farmers in each of the 31 rice farmers’ cooperatives 
were positively protected by government policies, as indicated by an EPC > 1. 
• Likewise, farmers in each cooperative sold rice in domestic market at prices higher than 
corresponding world rice prices, as indicated by NPCO > 1, due to subsidies in the output 
markets.  
• With regards to inputs markets, the majority, 27 of the 31 cooperatives, of rice farmers 
purchased tradable inputs on aggregate at prices lower than corresponding world prices, 
as indicated by NPCI less than 1. These results were consistent with regional estimates. 
• The proportion of increase in social farm revenue that would be required to maintain 
current farm profit levels, if policy support and market failures were eliminated, ranged 
from 27 % to 87 % across the sampled cooperatives. 
5.4.2 PAMs results under sensitivity analysis 
The PAM is static and conditional on prevailing government’s policies, technology, and market 
conditions. For a dynamic analysis, the PAM is re-estimated under six scenarios: 1) Falling world 
prices, 2) Changing trading partners, 3) Rising mechanization, 4) Improved seed adaption, 5) 
market labour wage = shadow labour wage, 6) Impact of protective trade policies. 
First scenario: Knowing that commodity prices are volatile on the world market, this study 
assumed a situation where there was a 20 % decrease in world rice prices while other factors held 
constant. Under this scenario, the Eastern Province of Rwanda would lose its comparative 
advantage. Rice production would incur a net economic loss of Frw 120082.3 (USD 175.5). The 
DRC ratio would increase to 1.21 (see Table 5-8 and Table 5-14). Only 2 or 6.5 % of the farmers’ 
cooperatives would have a comparative advantage (see Appendix F). 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 - 65 - 
 
Table 5-8: PAM in a 20 % decrease in world rice prices scenario 
PROFIT    REVENUE     COSTS 
 
  
        TRADABLE INPUTS       DOMESTIC FACTORS 
  Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD 
Private prices 439 478.4 642.1 1 373 814.0 2 007.3 328 701.8 480.3 605 633.9 884.9 
Social prices -120 082.3 -175.5 914 130.6 1 335.6 343 548.0 502.0 690 664.9 1 009.1 
DIVERGENCES 559 560.7 817.6 459 683.4 671.6 -14 846.3 -21.7 -85 031.1 -124.2 
Source: Research findings 
Second scenario: This study used Pakistan’s FOB rice price of USD 392 per MT as the reference 
world price because Pakistan was the major exporter of rice to Rwanda (ICT, 2014). In the 
second scenario, the FOB world price for rice exported by India (the major global exporter of 
rice)70, of 385 USD/MT, was used as a reference (see Appendix G).  
In this scenario, the Eastern Province of Rwanda would have no comparative advantage in rice 
production. Rice production would incur an Frw 21492.8/ha (USD 31.4/ha) net social loss. The 
DRC would increase to 1.03 (see Table 5-9 and Table 5-14). Only 8, or 25.8 %, of the 
cooperatives would have a comparative advantage (refer to Appendix H). 
Table 5-9: PAM in a scenario where FOB rice price for India rice is used as reference price 
PROFIT REVENUE COSTS 
 
  
    TRADABLE INPUTS DOMESTIC FACTORS 
  Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD 
Private prices 439 478.4 642.1 1 373 814.0 2 007.3 328 701.8 480.3 605 633.9 884.9 
Social prices -21 492.8 -31.4 1 012 720.1 1 479.7 343 548.0 502.0 690 664.9 1 009.1 
DIVERGENCES 460 971.2 673.5 361 093.9 527.6 -14 846.3 -21.7 -85 031.1 -124.2 
Source: Research findings 
Third scenario: A comparative analysis of rice production costs between the Eastern Province of 
Rwanda and a selection of major global exporters of rice was conducted, as summarized in 
Appendix I. The comparative analysis showed that Rwanda has a higher relative labour cost per 
ha, due a high relative labour usage. For instance, the Asian countries Thailand and Vietnam use 
between 200 and 2030 labour hours/ha, on which they spend less than USD 220. On the other 
hand, in the Eastern Province of Rwanda, 6589.41 labour hours/ha are used, costing rice farmers 
USD 831.3.  
                                                 
70
 Reference is made to ICT (2014) 
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It is very likely that the relatively higher quantity of labour used in Rwanda is due to a lack of 
mechanization. For instance, farmers in Thailand and Vietnam use labour saving technologies 
such as wheel tractors, power tillers, combine harvesters, irrigation pumps, herbicides, etc. 
(Agribenchmark, 2014:12-25). This technology use is uncommon in rice farming in Rwanda. 
Therefore, the third scenario assumed a situation where farmers would adopt a new farming 
technology that could reduce the labour quantity use by 25 %, assuming that production costs for 
other inputs remain constant. In this scenario, the Eastern Province of Rwanda would gain a 
comparative advantage, as indicated by an Frw 173214.6/ha (USD 253.1/ha) net social profit and 
a DRC of 0.76 (see Table 5-10 and Table 5-14). The farmers ‘cooperatives with a comparative 
disadvantage would decrease from 67.7 % to 45.2 % (refer to Appendix J). 
Table 5-10:  PAM in a scenario where the quantity of labour used is reduced by 25 % 
PROFIT REVENUE COSTS 
 
  
    TRADABLE INPUTS DOMESTIC FACTORS 
  Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD 
Private prices 581 709.8 849.9 1 373 814.0 2 007.3 328 701.8 480.3 463 402.5 677.1 
Social prices 173 214.6 253.1 1 051 177.0 1 535.9 343 548.0 502.0 534 414.4 780.8 
DIVERGENCES 408 495.2 596.8 322 637.0 471.4 -14 846.3 -21.7 -71 012.0 -103.8 
Source: Research findings 
Fourth scenario: The fourth scenario assumed reduction in yield of 25% for each cooperative, 
compared with the basic scenario. In this scenario, the average rice yield reduced from 6.05 
MT/ha to 4.49 MT/ha. As a result, the Eastern Province of Rwanda would lose comparative 
advantage in rice, as indicated by a net social loss of Frw 245830.2 (USD 359.2). The DRC ratio 
would increase to 1.55 (see Table 5-11 & Table 5-14). Only one cooperative would have a 
comparative advantage (Refer to appendix K). 
Table 5-11: PAM in a 25 % rice yield decrease scenario, in each cooperative. 
PROFIT REVENUE COSTS 
 
  
    TRADABLE INPUTS DOMESTIC FACTORS 
  Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD 
Private prices 96 024.9 140.3 1 030 360.5 1 505.5 328 701.8 480.3 605 633.9 884.9 
Social prices -245 830.2 -359.2 788 382.8 1 151.9 343 548.0 502.0 690 664.9 1 009.1 
DIVERGENCES 341 855.1 499.5 241 977.7 353.6 -14 846.3 -21.7 -85 031.1 -124.2 
Source: Research findings 
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Fifth scenario: In this scenario, the actual labour wage is used as a proxy for the social price of 
both hired and family labour. In this scenario, the Eastern Province of Rwanda would have no 
comparative advantage, as indicated by an Frw 842.3/ha (USD 1.2/ha) net social loss and a DRC 
of 1.001 (see Table 5-12, Table 5-14, and Appendix L). 
Table 5-12: Prevailing labour market wage used in the social valuation of both family and 
hired labour 
PROFIT REVENUE COSTS 
 
  
    TRADABLE INPUTS DOMESTIC FACTORS 
  Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD 
Private prices 439 478.4 642.1 1 373 814.0 2 007.3 328 701.8 480.3 605 633.9 884.9 
Social prices -842.3 -1.2 1 051 177.0 1 535.9 343 548.0 502.0 708 471.3 1 035.1 
DIVERGENCES 440 320.7 643.3 322 637.0 471.4 -14 846.3 -21.7 -102 837.4 -150.3 
Source: Research findings 
Sixth scenario: The sixth scenario measures the impact of a 52.4 % MFN rice import tariff, 
which was prevalent in 2014, on the protection of domestic rice subsector. As summarized in 
Table 5-13 below, if this import tariff was to be included in the estimation of the IPP, the social 
farm profit would have increased by 24 times, from Frw 16964.1 (USD 24.8) to Frw 409102.5/ha 
(USD 597.7), and would diverge from the actual private farm profit by only Frw 30375.9/ha 
(USD 44.4/ha).71 This scenario implies that the rice import tariff increases significantly the 
domestic price of imported rice, which improves the price competitiveness of domestic rice 
farmers. (Refer to Appendix D, for the IPP added with the rice import tariff). 
Table 5-13: Impact of rice import tariff on domestic rice protection 
PROFIT REVENUE COSTS 
 
  
    TRADABLE INPUTS DOMESTIC FACTORS 
  Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD Frw USD 
Private prices 439 478.4 642.1 1 373 814.0 2 007.3 328 701.8 480.3 605 633.9 884.9 
Social prices 409 102.5 597.7 1 443 315.5 2 108.8 343 548.0 502.0 690 664.9 1 009.1 
DIVERGENCES 30 375.9 44.4 -69 501.5 -101.5 -14 846.3 -21.7 -85 031.1 -124.2 
Source: Research findings 
 
 
 
                                                 
71
 Refer to Appendix M for the PAM indicators results under this scenario. 
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Table 5-14: PAM ratio indicators under different scenarios 
N Scenarios NSP (USD/ha) PCR DRC NPCO NPCI EPC SRP 
0 Basic scenario: current conditions 24.8 0.58 0.98 1.31 0.96 1.48 0.40 
1 Falling world prices (-) 175.5 0.58 1.21 1.50 0.96 1.83 0.61 
2 Changing trading partners (-) 31.4 0.58 1.03 1.36 0.96 1.56 0.46 
3 Rising mechanization 253.1 0.44 0.76 1.31 0.96 1.48 0.39 
4 Improved seed adaption (-) 359.2 0.86 1.55 1.31 0.96 1.58 0.43 
5 Market labour wage=Social labour wage (-) 1.2 0.58 1.00 1.31 0.96 1.48 0.42 
6 Impact of rice import tariff 44.4 0.58 0.63 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.02 
Source: Research findings 
From these scenarios, it can be inferred that the factors that would contribute positively to the 
comparative advantage of Rwanda in rice production, if other factors are held constant, are an 
increase in the world rice price, a reduction in the social domestic factor (i.e. labour) cost, and a 
higher rice yield. The factors that would contribute negatively to the comparative advantage 
include, among others, a decrease in world rice price and poor rice yield. 
Furthermore, since the Eastern Province of Rwanda has a net social profit of close to zero, the 2nd 
and 5th scenarios showed that if the FOB India rice export price or the prevailing labour market 
wage could have been used respectively as a proxies for the social price of rice and labour, the 
Eastern Province of Rwanda would have had no comparative advantage. 
5.5 Summary 
The chapter 5 presents and provides a discussion on the data. It shows that the Eastern Province 
of Rwanda had a comparative advantage in rice production. However, it was not economically 
efficient at producing rice in all marshlands. Due to protective government policies (i.e. import 
tariffs, farm input subsidies), rice production was financially profitable, even in those marshlands 
with a comparative disadvantage. 
Different scenarios are provided. These show that a persistent downward trend in world rice 
prices would negatively affect the comparative advantage of Rwanda in rice. Consequently, 
farmers would abandon rice production for other profitable crops. On the other hand, the 
adoption of labour saving technologies would significantly improve the comparative advantage 
position of the Province, since labour is the largest contributor to farm production costs. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and policy recommendations 
Since agriculture is the economic engine of rural Africa, allocating agricultural resources 
efficiently would stimulate poverty reduction. Though more than 80% of the marshlands with a 
high potential for rice production in Rwanda are uncultivated, during the last decade, the country 
has been recording increasing domestic rice trade deficit. This study is aimed at assessing why 
Rwanda has remained a net importer of rice despite its endowment of abundant unused 
marshland resources. In order to address this issue, this study assessed whether Rwanda has 
comparative advantage in rice production and then identified different factors limiting efficiency. 
The scope of the study was the Eastern Province of Rwanda, which is the major province 
producer of rice. 
6.1 Thesis overview 
Chapter two reviews the literature and other available information on the policy environment 
relating to the Rwandan rice subsector, as well as the structure, conduct, and performance of its 
value chain. In section 2.2 some policy instruments that have the potential to distort inputs and 
output markets were identified. These include protectionist policies such as fertilizer price 
subsidization, the rice import tariff, and regulation of the paddy rice price. On the other hand, the 
land policy that limits private ownership and usage rights of marshland also has the potential to 
create disincentives for rice production.  
The structure and conduct of the rice value chain are discussed in sections 2.3 and 2.4, 
respectively. It is shown that until 2014, the importation and distribution of fertilizers took place 
under a less competitive market. In addition, the land rental market was not competitive, as the 
government was the sole owner (lessor) of marshland. On the other hand, farmers’ integration 
into cooperatives has improved the level of vertical integration along the rice value chain. For 
instance, it has become easier for farmers to get forward marketing contracts through their 
cooperatives. Besides this, there is an easy flow of information among farmers and other actors 
along the chain.  
It is shown that despite a prevailing rice deficit in the domestic market, milling plants overall 
operate at below capacity due to insufficient raw materials. Furthermore, although 70 % of 
domestic rice farmers cultivate short and bold types of rice, only 14 % of domestic consumers 
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prefer this type of rice. The majority of consumers prefer long grain and fragrant rice, most of 
which is imported. 
Section 2.5 focuses on the performance of the value chain. In this section it is illustrated that over 
the last decade, Rwanda has been recording an increasing rice trade deficit. This increasing rice 
deficit is due to the inability of domestic rice production to keep pace with increasing rice 
demand in the domestic market. Furthermore, domestic rice prices are relatively high compared 
with the rest of the world, which is a hindrance for the competitiveness of locally produced rice. 
In chapter three, comparative advantage is defined as the ability of a country to produce a product 
at the lowest opportunity cost relative to the rest of the world. Here, it is explained that in 
developing countries and in the agricultural sector, trade is mostly determined by comparative 
advantage. Countries tend to specialize in the production of those commodities that they can 
produce at a lower relative opportunity cost than the rest of the world, in exchange for those 
commodities that they can produce at a higher relative opportunity cost.  
In other cases, especially in developed countries and in manufacturing sectors, trade is based on 
factors other than comparative advantage. These factors include, among others, economies of 
scale, product differentiation, the technology gap, and product cycle. It is also illustrated how 
input and output market distortions alter trade flows (as determined by comparative advantage), 
hence reducing social welfare.  
Chapter 4 is devoted to explaining the methodology used to address the research questions. 
Among the different measures of comparative advantage that are presented, the PAM is the 
option chosen. Here, it is explained that the PAM is basically about the uses of farm budget data 
to measure the private and social profitability of a specific crop production system. In a private 
analysis, cost and price data are expressed in actual market prices. Consequently, private profit 
measures the competitiveness of private farmers, given prevailing policies and market failures.  
On the other hand, in a social analysis, cost and price data are expressed in social prices, which 
are those prices that reflect the opportunity cost of resources. Social profit measures the 
comparative advantage and economic efficiency of a production system. The divergences 
between private and social values indicate the extent to which input and output markets are 
distorted.  
The chapter sets out the different data that were required to construct the PAM as well as the 
different data collection techniques that were used to gather it. These techniques consist of a farm 
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survey, informal interviews with different stakeholders within the rice subsector, and consultation 
of secondary sources of data. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to presenting and discussing the research findings. The PAM’s results reveal 
that from the farmers’ perspective, rice farming in the Eastern Province of Rwanda was 
profitable. This profitability was indicated by a net farm private (financial) profit of Frw 439 
475.3/ha (USD 642.3/ha). On the other hand, the social (economic) analysis revealed that rice 
production was marginally profitable at Frw 16964.1/ha (USD 24.8/ha). This social profitability 
was also indicated by a DRC of 0.98, implying that for each Frw 0.98 of domestic factors used in 
rice production, valued at their opportunity cost, there was Frw 1 of value added in social prices. 
In other words, the Eastern Province of Rwanda had a static comparative advantage in rice. 
The private farm profit was higher than the social farm profit, as indicated by a positive net 
transfer of Frw 422514.3 (USD 617.3), implying that there were inefficiencies within the rice 
subsector. Of this net transfer, 76 % (or Frw 322637/ha) were derived from output markets, 20 % 
(or Frw 85028) from domestic factor markets, and 4 % (or Frw 14846.3/ha) from tradable inputs 
markets. Briefly, inefficiencies within the rice subsector derived mainly from output markets. 
The EPC, of 1.48, was much greater than 1, implying that there is a high level of incentivization 
given by the government to farmers for producing rice. For instance, the NPCO was estimated at 
1.31, implying that domestic rice prices were 31 % higher than reference world rice prices. 
Furthermore, the NPCI was 0.96, suggesting that domestic prices of tradable inputs are on 
aggregate 4 % lower than corresponding world prices. 
A detailed analysis shows that, though overall the Eastern Province had a comparative advantage 
for rice, 21 or 67.7 % of the cooperatives had a comparative disadvantage. However, due to 
protective government policies, rice production was financially unprofitable only for 2 (or 6.5% 
of) cooperatives. 
6.2 Key findings 
• The study findings reveal that generally in free trade and competitive markets, farmers 
would rather sell rice in the domestic market at competitive prices than imported rice.  
• Because rice production is not economically efficient for all cooperatives, some of the 
rice marshlands that are currently used for rice production would be allocated to the 
production of other crops that would generate the highest social profit.  
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• Since the objective of the government is to make Rwanda self-sufficient in rice 
production72; under current conditions, the government restricts the importation of rice by 
using import tariff policy instruments. Moreover, the government provides input subsidies 
for farmers to improve the rice yield, through using more adequate inputs, as well as 
reducing farm production costs.73 The protective policies allow rice farming to be 
financially profitable even for those marshlands with comparative disadvantage, therefore, 
allowing farmers to gain domestic market share.  
• Since imported rice is differentiated from domestic local rice, at the prevailing imported 
rice price, some domestic consumers are willing to buy imported rice. This willingness to 
pay explains why rice importation prevails, despite imported rice’s relatively higher 
domestic market price.  
6.3 Policy recommendations 
• Allocate wetland resources efficiently. It was revealed that under the area of study, 10 
of the 31 cooperatives, cultivating rice on 75 % of the total area under study, are the only 
efficient at producing rice. In these 10 cooperatives, the average farm size per farmer, of 
0.22ha, is higher than the average farm size per farmer, of 0.12ha, in the remaining 21 
cooperatives with no comparative advantage. In short, the larger were farms the more 
farmers were efficient. Due to Rwanda government high concern on land distribution, 
large scale farming in Rwanda is very limited, which limits exploitation of economies of 
scale. Therefore, in order to increase the area where rice is produced efficiently, the 
government should promote non-farm activities that would absorb excess number of 
small rice farmers to allow efficient farmers to hold larger pieces of land. 
• Research and development: Mechanization. In order to improve the comparative 
advantage position of Rwanda rice subsector, it is a prerequisite to minimize rice 
production social costs. The research findings revealed that labour accounted for the 
largest share (60.89%) of the total paddy production cost. 53.4 % is allocated to weeding, 
harvesting, and post-harvesting activities (threshing, winnowing and drying). Though in 
several rice producing countries farmers use labour saving technologies (i.e. herbicides, 
                                                 
72
 Refer to MINAGRI (2011c:20) 
73
 These protective policies are consistent with government’s priority objectives of making Rwanda self-sufficient in 
rice production and reducing the rice trade deficit 
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power tillers, draft animals, combine harvesters, etc.) to minimize production costs74; the 
use of this technology is uncommon in the Eastern Province of Rwanda, where all of 
these farming and post-harvesting activities are done manually. An assumed scenario 
where the quantity of labour hours used was arbitrarily reduced by 25%, assuming that 
other input costs remain constant, revealed that the number of cooperatives with a 
comparative advantage will increase from 10 (or 32.3%) to 17 (or 54.8%). Therefore, 
government should engage in promoting research, innovation, and information 
dissemination that would improve the use of appropriate labour saving technologies for 
rice farming.  
• Research and development: Varietal improvement. Since imported rice is 
differentiated from local rice by grain shape, fragrance, and quality, comparative 
advantage is not a sufficient condition for domestic farmers to compete in the domestic 
market. Since the majority of domestic rice consumers prefer long grain and fragrant rice 
varieties, which are mostly imported75; it would remain a challenge for domestic rice 
farmers to gain domestic market share. Therefore, further research on identifying long 
grain and fragrant rice varieties that can adapt to the Rwandan agro-ecology should be 
conducted. Moreover, farmers should be incited to adopt farming practices that preserve 
rice quality. 
• Reduce rice trade barriers: During sensitivity analysis, it was illustrated that the rice 
import tariff improves domestic rice price competitiveness against imported rice.  
Although the rice import tariff protect domestic rice producers from foreign competition, 
higher domestic rice prices reduce the range of rice that is consumed in the domestic 
market76, which hence negatively affects domestic consumers. Even though the Rwandan 
agro-ecology favours the production of short grain and bold types of rice, which have a 
limited market demand relative to imported rice, there are potential opportunities for the 
exportation of the excess supply in regional markets where rice traded is free of duties. 
Increasing the exportation of domestic rice and eliminating rice import tariffs would 
benefit both domestic rice producers and consumers, while keeping the rice trade balance 
                                                 
74
 Reference for labour saving technology use in other rice producing countries is made to Agribenchmark (2014:16-
27) ; Barker, Herdt & Rose (1985:88-115); Hussain, Khattak & Khan (2008:746); Shariff (2011:113-116) 
75
 Refer to MINAGRI (2011c:13); Kathiresan (2013:19) 
76
 Refer to chapter three on the impact of import tariff on the domestic consumption of the protected commodity. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 - 74 - 
 
stable. Therefore, this study recommends that the government should encourage exporting 
domestic rice in the region as well as reducing existing trade barriers to importing rice. 
• Promote usage of organic fertilizers: In order to improve comparative advantage, 
therefore, use agricultural resources more efficiently, farmers have to minimize social 
farm production costs. The research findings showed that imported chemical fertilizers 
are the second-largest contributor to paddy production cost, at 21%. As a landlocked 
country, higher transportation and related costs along the transport corridor77 are among 
the important determinants of higher relative cost of imported inputs. Yet, the use of 
compost remains low, as on average, only 158.1 Kg of compost is applied on 1 ha of 
marshland, with only 9.7 % of cooperatives using compost.78 Various studies 
demonstrated that inorganic fertilizers are more efficient when used in combination with 
rice straw-based compost.79 In other words, at the same rice yield, farmers can reduce the 
amount of inorganic fertilizers used, by using rice straw-based compost. Therefore, 
Rwandan rice farmers should be incited to substitute expensive chemical fertilizers with 
rice straw-based compost. 
 
 
                                                 
77
 According to the World Bank (2010:217), as a landlocked country, transportation and related cost account for 
more than 40 % of the value of goods imported by Rwanda. 
78
 This low usage of compost was attributed, by Promar Consulting, (2012:65), to the inability of Rwandan rice 
farmers to move compost due to a long distance between homes (where farmers raise livestock) to rice marshlands. 
79
 Refer to Hesse (1984:40); Eagle, Bird, Horwath, Linquist, Brouder, Hill & van Kessel (2000;1102) 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Farm survey questionnaire 
 
  Questionnaire Code                                                                                                             Date of interview: … …/… …/ … …. …. 
Introduction 
This farm survey is being conducted by Benjamin Nkurunziza for the purpose of completing his master’s thesis in agricultural economics. 
The aim of this survey is to identify the input quantity requirements, yields, expenditure on inputs and paddy rice farm gate price, for a 
typical rice farm in the Eastern Province of Rwanda. Knowing this information would help the researcher to estimate the comparative cost 
advantage of Rwanda in rice production relative to the rest of the world. 
This survey is anonymous. We would appreciate if you could answer the following questions authentically. 
 
A. Farmer's Identification 
A.1 Cooperative name:  
A.2 Cell Name:  A.3 Sector Name:  
A.4 District Name:  A.5 Province Name:  
Instructions: 
• This survey is based on one agricultural season, and it uses current market prices. 
• The estimated quantity of inputs used in rice production and farm yields are those of a representative farm of the size that is 
estimated in question B.1. 
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B. Farm Size and Land Rental Value 
B.1 What is the average size of a 
representative (most common) farm in your 
cooperative? 
 
    Codes for unit: 
   Square meters: …….......1 
   Hectare:……….…….…2 
   Area…...…………..…...3 
   Other (Specify):….....….4 
B.2 What is the total 
rental value for that 
farm? (In Frw, as 
paid to the local 
government) 
B.3 What is the rental value of a farm of approximately equal size to the representative farm, if 
rented from upland (in a private market)? (In Frw) 
Note: If an in-kind payment, please, assist the respondents by estimating the equivalent in 
monetary terms, using prevailing market prices. 
                                    
Farm size 
Unit Quantity Rental value in Frw Rental value in Frw 
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C. Uses of Intermediate Inputs (Seeds, Fertilizers, Pesticides and Fuel) 
C.1 What are the intermediate 
inputs used by the farmer? 
 
C.2 What quantity of each 
intermediate input does the 
farmer use on this representative 
farm? 
Codes for intermediate inputs: 
Seeds……………..………1 
NPK……………….……..2 
UREA……………………3  
Compost……………….....4 
Cypermethrin……….……5  
Beam (Trycyclazole)……..6 
Benomyl (Benlate)……….7              
Fuel……………………....8 
Codes for unit: 
mgs…….1/grs………..….2  
Kgs…….3/ml………..…..4   
cl……….5/l…….…….….6     
Others (specify)….............7 
C.3 Where does the 
farmer source each of 
these inputs? 
 
Source of the input: 
Home………….....1                       
Another farmer......2 
Cooperative...........3 
Market ……….….5 
Other (specify)…..6 
 
C.4 In which district 
does the farmer 
source the input? 
 
C.5 Does the farmer get any 
direct price support on this 
purchased input?  
Yes…...1/No……2 (Please tick) 
 
C.6 If support is received, what 
amount of money does the 
farmer pay for each unit of this 
input? 
 
C.7 What amount of money 
would the farmer pay without 
price support? 
C.8 What is the 
distance between 
the farm and the 
source of the input? 
 
Codes for unit: 
Minutes walking..1 
Km……………...2 
m………..……....3 
Other(specify)…..4 
 
C.9 What is the 
mode of transport 
used? 
 
Code: 
Codes for mode of 
transport 
On foot……….….1 
On own bicycle …2 
On a bicycle taxi...3 
Other (specify)…..4 
 
 
C.10 If the 
famer carries 
the input 
himself / 
herself to the 
farm, by foot 
or with own 
bicycle, how 
much time is 
spent 
travelling 
back and 
forth? 
 
Unit for time:                
Hours…..…1 
Minutes…...2  
C.11 If the 
famer uses a 
taxi (bicycle, 
motor bicycle, 
truck) as a 
mode of 
transport, how 
much money 
does the 
farmer spend 
in total to 
carry these 
inputs at 
farm? 
 
 
 
Input Unit Quantity Source: 
Institution 
Source: 
District 
Yes/ 
No 
Paid price 
(with 
support) 
Paid price 
(without 
support) 
Unit Quantity Mode of transport Unit Quant
ity 
Amount (Frw) 
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D. Uses of agricultural equipment (machinery, vehicles and tools) on the representative farm 
D.1 What are the different types 
of equipment (machinery, 
vehicles and tools) used by the 
farmer, in rice farming? 
 
 
D.2 What is the quantity of each 
item of equipment that the farmer 
uses on this representative farm? 
 
Code for equipment:  
Hoe………………...…..…..1 
Machete 1…………..……....2    
Machete 2…………….…….3 
Shovel…………..……….....4 
Rake…………………..……5 
Sickle.…….………………..6 
Sprayer………………...…...7  
Bags………………………..8  
Tent……………….……..…9  
Other (specify)……………10 
 
 
D.3 Where does the 
farmer source each of 
these items of 
equipment? 
 
Source of the input: 
Home……………...1                       
Another farmer…....2 
Cooperative.............3 
Market …………....5 
Other (specify)…....6 
 
D.4 In which district 
does the farmer 
source the input? 
 
D.5 Does the farmer get any 
direct price support on this 
purchased equipment?  
Yes…...1/No……2 
 
D.6 If support is received, what is 
the amount of money that the 
farmer pays for each unit of this 
equipment? 
 
D.7 If there is no price support, 
what is the unit acquisition price 
for this equipment? 
D.8 What is the 
distance between 
the farm and the 
source of the 
equipment? 
 
Codes for unit: 
Minutes walking..1 
Km……...….…...2 
m…………..........3 
Other (specify)....4 
 
D.9 What is the 
mode of transport 
used? 
 
Code: 
Codes for mode of 
transport 
On foot………....1 
On own bicycle...2 
On a bicycle taxi.3 
Other (specify)...4 
 
 
D.10 If the famer 
carries the 
equipment on the 
farm himself / 
herself, on foot or 
with own bicycle, 
how much time is 
spent going back 
and forth? 
 
Unit for time:                
Hours…………1 
Minutes……....2 
D.11 If the 
famer uses 
a taxi 
(bicycle, 
motor 
bicycle, 
truck) as a 
mode of 
transport, 
how much 
does the 
farmer 
spend in 
total to 
bring these 
items of 
equipment 
to the 
farm? 
 
Equipment Unit Quantity Source: 
Institution 
Source: 
District 
Yes/ 
No 
Paid price 
(with 
support) 
Paid price 
(Without 
support) 
Unit Quantity Mode of transport Unit Quantity Amount 
(Frw) 
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In this section, list 
the equipment used 
as specified in D.1 
D.12 Does the farmer use this equipment in the 
production of other crops?  
Yes/No (Please tick)                                   
Code: Yes…1 No…2  
D.13 If yes, what proportion (%) of the total use of 
this equipment does the farmer allocate to rice 
production?   
D.14 What is the useful 
life for each item of 
equipment? 
Codes for useful life? 
Seasons…………1 
Years…………...2  
 
D.15 After the useful life of the 
equipment, what does the farmer 
do with it?  
Codes for uses after the useful life: 
Throw it away…………….1    
Sell it………………….......2              
Other (specify)……….…....3 
D.16 If the equipment is sold, how 
much money would the farmer 
expect to get from the sale of the 
equipment? (in Frw) 
D.17 Is this equipment 
maintained and/or 
repaired?  
Yes…..1/No……2 
(Please tick) 
D.18 if yes, how much 
money on average does 
the farmer spend on the 
maintenance and repair of 
this equipment each 
season? 
Equipment ‘Yes’ if used 
elsewhere, ‘no’ if 
not 
Proportion (%) Unit Quantity Uses Amount 
(Frw) 
Yes/No Amount 
(Frw) 
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E. Equipment hire 
E.1 Does the farmer use any hired equipment 
(machinery and vehicles) in rice production?                                            
Yes ………1   No…………..2 
 
If No, Skip to F1. 
 
E.2 If yes, specify which type of equipment. 
 
E.3 What is the quantity of each 
type of hired equipment that the 
farmer uses? 
 
E.4 Does the farmer use the equipment 
in the production of crops, other than 
rice? Yes/No (Please tick)                       
 
CODE:                                       
Yes…1 No…2   
 
E.5 If yes, what proportion (%) of 
total use of that equipment does the 
farmer allocate to rice production?   
 
E.6 For how much does the farmer rent 
each type of equipment, for one 
agricultural season? 
Equipment Description Quantity hired Proportion (%) Amount (Frw)/unit 
Amount (Frw)/all 
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F. Labour use 
F.1 In this section, list all of the rice 
farming activities requiring the use of 
labour.  
 
F.2 How many family members 
(including the farmer) does the farmer 
use for each activity on the 
representative farm? 
F.3 How many external (paid) labourers 
does the farmer use for each activity on 
the representative farm? 
F.4 For how many weeks do those 
labourers work? 
F.5 During each week, how many 
days does each labourer work? 
F.6 During a day, how many hours 
does each labourer work? 
F.7 What total amount of 
money does the farmer pay as 
remuneration of this labour? 
Note: If an in-kind payment, 
assist the farmers to estimate 
the equivalent in monetary 
terms using prevailing market 
prices. 
Quantity Weeks Days Hours Amount (Frw) 
 Family labour 
 External 
labour 
Land preparation       
Seedbed preparation       
Seedbed follow-up         
Ploughing and puddling       
Transplanting seedlings and planting         
NPK fertilizer application       
First weeding         
First UREA application       
First pesticide application       
Second weeding       
Second UREA application         
Second pesticide application       
Third weeding         
Third pesticide application       
Fourth weeding       
Water channeling       
Bird scaring         
Harvesting, transportation to cooperative, 
and threshing      
 
Drying       
Winnowing       
Packaging       
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G. Harvesting and transportation of bundles of rice to cooperative’s drying and storage facilities 
G.1 What is the estimated distance 
between the farm and the 
cooperative’s drying and storage 
facilities? 
 
Codes for unit :                      
Minutes walking ………..…...1 
Km………………………..….2 
m………………………...…...3 
Other (specify)………………..4 
 
G.2 What is the mode of transport used to take the produce 
(bundles of rice) to the cooperative’s facilities?  
 
Codes for mode of transport 
On foot………………….1 
On own bicycle………....2 
On a bicycle taxi………..3 
Other (specify)………….4 
 
G.3 If the famer uses a taxi (bicycle, 
motor bicycle, truck) as a mode of 
transport, how much money does the 
farmer spend on that transportation? 
Unit Distance Mode of transport Amount (Frw) 
    
 
        H. Preliminary post-harvesting activities incurred at the cooperative’s facilities 
H.1 What are different post-harvest activities conducted at 
cooperatives before the produce is sold to the milling 
plant? 
Threshing………………………..….…..1                      
Drying……………………………....…..2          
Winnowing...………………………..…..3        
Storing………………………….…….....4                         
Other (please specify)……………..……5 
H.2 How (in which way) does the cooperative charge the farmer for these 
activities conducted at the cooperative? 
 
Activity Mode of payment Amount (Frw) Total Amount 
(Frw) 
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 I. Sale of paddy rice 
I.1 Under normal weather conditions, 
what is the mostly likely quantity of 
paddy rice that the farmer would expect to 
produce from the representative farm? 
Code for unit:                                                                                                               
Kgs……………………….….1                                                                                         
Tons……………………...…..2                                                                            
Other (Specify……..………...3 
I.2 What is the 
name of the 
milling plant to 
which the farmers’ 
cooperative sells 
paddy rice?
I.3 What is the estimated 
distance between the 
milling plant and the 
cooperative’s storage 
facilities? 
Codes for unit :                      
Km…….………...1 
Truck Hours…….2 
m….....……..…...3 
Other (specify)…..4 
I.4 What amount of money does the milling plant pay the farmer for 1 kg 
of paddy? 
I.5 How much money is deducted by the cooperative (excluding the 
amount deducted as a repayment for inputs taken by the farmer on loan) 
I.6 How much money is deducted for taxes?  
Unit Quantity Name Unit Quantity Price, Amount (Frw) Amount deducted by 
cooperative,  (Frw) 
Taxes 
(Frw) 
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APPENDIX B: Determinants of domestic marketing costs along each 
cooperative’s rice value chain 
Category Variable Unit Mean 
Determinants of 
the marketing cost 
along the rice 
value chain, for 
each cooperative 
TransportCost_RwandaBondedWarehousesToRiceWholesaleMarket Frw/MT 16883.2 
TransportCost_ RwandaBondedWarehousesToRiceWholesaleMarket USD/MT 24.7 
Distance_ RwandaBondedWarehousesToRiceWholesaleMarket Km 98.2 
TransportCost_RiceMillToWholesaleMarket Frw/MT 3787.3 
TransportCost_RiceMillToWholesaleMarket USD/MT 5.5 
Distance_RiceMillToWholesaleMarket Km 13.3 
MilledRicePrice_MillGate Frw/Kg 541.1 
MilledRicePrice_MillGate USD/Kg 0.8 
PaddyRicePrice_MillGatePriceEquivalent Frw/Kg 351.4 
PaddyRicePrice_MillGatePriceEquivalent USD/Kg 0.5 
FarmGatePrice_PaddyRice Frw/Kg 226.6 
FarmGatePrice_PaddyRice USD/Kg 0.3 
PriceMargin_PaddyRice_FarmGateToMillGate % 55.4 
Source: Survey data, Google Map (2014) 
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APPENDIX C: Paddy rice production in the Eastern Province of Rwanda 
during agricultural season 2014A. Disaggregated by farmers' cooperatives 
N Cooperative District Marshland Area Planted (ha) Production (MT) 
1 Twizamure Bugesera Gatare 25.0 120.0 
2 Inkingi y'ubuhinzi Bugesera Kibaza 25.0 125.0 
3 Copauki Bugesera KizanyeI 15.0 80.0 
4 Kopetwiteki Bugesera KizanyeII 24.0 60.0 
5 Corinyaburiba Bugesera Nyabuliba 33.0 150.0 
6 Coriru Bugesera Rurambi 300.0 1500.0 
7 Cogiriru Bugesera Ruvubu 55.0 250.0 
8 Koterwa Bugesera Rwabikwano 40.0 240.0 
9 Korivarwi Bugesera Rwintare 48.0 312.0 
10 Jyambere nyarugenge Bugesera - 11.0 72.0 
11 Dukundamahoro Bugesera - 10.0 40.0 
12 Corimak Gatsibo Kanyonyomba 380.0 1800.0 
13 Cooproriz ntende Gatsibo Ntende 485.0 2570.5 
14 Cocurika Kayonza Kabare 15.0 54.6 
15 Cocurivam kayonza Kayonza 43.0 197.8 
16 Cocuriru Kayonza Ruramira 32.0 150.4 
17 Mrgc Kirehe Binoni/mushikiri 46.0 193.2 
18 Coopriki Kirehe Kibaya cyunuzi 472.0 2171.2 
19 Isabane Kirehe Kinyogo 72.0 345.6 
20 Corimu Kirehe Musaza 12.0 60.0 
21 Kijumbura rice growers Kirehe - 12.0 72.0 
22 Cocurire Ngoma Buriba 35.0 161.0 
23 Duhuzimbaraga Ngoma Gahombo 11.0 60.0 
24 Cocurigi Ngoma Gisaya 65.0 292.5 
25 Coperig Ngoma Gitinga 60.0 270.0 
26 Kopamunya Ngoma Mutendeli 46.0 230.0 
27 Coprimwa Ngoma Mwambu 88.0 404.8 
28 Krf Ngoma - 60.0 92.0 
29 Corimi Ngoma Mirenge 185.0 888.0 
30 Corivanya Nyagatare Corivanya 120.0 300.0 
31 Co-dervam Nyagatare P1,2,3(muvumba) 400.0 1200.0 
32 Cooprorika Nyagatare P4(muvumba) 141.0 562.0 
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N Cooperative District Marshland Area Planted(ha) Production (MT) 
33 Coprimu Nyagatare  P5(muvumba) 137.0 203.2 
34 Cooperative Nyagatare  P8(Kirimburi) 282.0 1551.0 
35 Abahindi Nyagatare  P8(Kirimburi) 350.0 1050.0 
36 Cocuricyi Rwamagana  Cyimpima 49.8 248.8 
37 Cocuribu Rwamagana Bugugu 27.0 121.5 
38 Cocuricya Rwamagana Cyaruhogo 70.3 330.2 
39 Cocuriga Rwamagana Gashara 30.0 135.0 
40 Cocurimu Rwamagana Muhazi 5.0 21.0 
Source: RAB (2014) 
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APPENDIX D: Import parity price for rice (import tariff included). 
Stage/Steps Amount 
FOB Pakistan rice (25 % broken) (USD/MT) 392 
   + Freight cost. Karachi port to Mombasa/Kenya (USD/MT), 18 tons container 36.1 
   + Insurance cost, Karachi port to Mombasa (0.5 % of CIF), USD/MT 2.15 
CIF at Mombasa (USD/MT) 430.25 
   + Freight cost. Mombasa port to Kigali/Rwanda (USD/MT), 18 tons container 138.9 
+ Insurance cost Mombasa to Kigali (0.5 % of CIF), USD/Ton 2.86 
CIF at Kigali/Rwanda bonded warehouses (MAGERWA) (USD/MT) 572.01 
   + Import Tariff, (52.4 % of CIF at Mombasa port) 225.45 
   + VAT, (18 % of CIF at Rwanda bonded warehouses) 
 
IPP at Rwanda Bonded warehouses, USD/MT 797.46 
    * Official Exchange rate (Frw/USD) 684.24 
IPP at Rwanda bonded warehouses (Frw/MT) 545654 
   + Handling cost (Unloading, reload etc.) (Frw/MT), 10 Frw/Kg  10000 
   + Parking fees (Frw/MT), 18 tons container, Frw 10000 lump sum 555.56 
   + Storage cost (Frw/Ton), 1 Frw/day (The first 3 days are free of charge) 2000 
   + VAT, (18 % of Handling, parking and storage costs) 
 
IPP  at Rwanda bonded warehouses exit gate (Frw/MT) 558209.6 
  + Transport Cost to rice wholesale market (Frw/MT), 15 tons container 16883.24 
IPP at wholesale market (Frw/MT) 575092.8 
  - Transport cost milling plant to wholesale market (Frw/MT) 3787.3 
  - Loading cost (Frw/MT) 2000 
IPP at milling plant gate  569305.5 
     * Conversion factor (Paddy rice to Milled rice) 0.65 
IPP (Paddy rice equivalent) at milling plant gate 370048.6 
           price margin between farm and milled rice gate 55% 
  / (1+Marketing margin) 
 IPP at farm gate level (Frw/MT) 238741 
IPP at farm gate level (USD/MT) 348.8224 
Source:Compiled based on farm survey findings; Bahati (2014); BNR (2014a); Bolloré Africa logistics (2014); 
Bwimba (2014); Mac Map (2014); Murangira (2014); CORIMI (2014); Mukaparadi (2014); Itegeri (2014); 
Mutsindashyaka (2014); Ndayizeye (2014); Basabira(2014); Nkubiri (2014); Seyanga (2014). 
                                                 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 XIV 
 
APPENDIX E: Weighted averages for expenditure on inputs and farm revenues (over 1 ha), during one 
agricultural season.80 
Category Variables Mean (Frw) Mean (USD) 
Output Farm Revenue 1373814.01 2007.27 
Land LandRental_Marshland 21135.75 30.88 
Equipment/Tools 
Hoe_Expenditure 5440.30 7.95 
Machete1_Expenditure 1098.07 1.60 
Basin_Expenditure 401.03 0.59 
WateringCan_Expenditure 5.38 0.01 
Machete2_Expenditure 1353.71 1.98 
Sprayer_Expenditure 20387.49 29.79 
Shovel _Expenditure 1270.81 1.86 
Sickle_Expenditure 1932.43 2.82 
Tents_Expenditure 40024.35 58.48 
Basket _Expenditure 22.01 0.03 
Winnower_Expenditure 3928.22 5.74 
String1 _Expenditure 1113.82 1.63 
String2 _Expenditure 76.54 0.11 
Rake _Expenditure 820.36 1.20 
Hoe2 _Expenditure 105.14 0.15 
Bags_Expenditure 17244.51 25.20 
Labour 
FamilyLabour_Expenditure 0.00 0.00 
ExternalLabour_Expenditure 568925.60 831.25 
Fertilizers 
NPK_Expenditure 108166.60 158.04 
UREA_Expenditure 88819.95 129.77 
Compost_Expenditure 0.00 0.00 
Pesticides 
Cypermethrin_Expenditure 11056.6033 16.15 
Dimethoate_Expenditure 169.7114 0.25 
Beam_Expenditure 10812.5036 15.80 
Benomyly_expenditure 85.4160 0.12 
Seeds Seeds 15120.11 22.09 
Contributions Cooperative Contributions to cooperative 14819.22 21.65 
Source: Research findings
                                                 
80
 They were estimated based on the share of each cooperative in the total paddy rice produced by the 31 cooperatives under the scope of this study, during agricultural 
season 2014 A (refer to appendix C). 
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APPENDIX F: PAM indicators in a 20 % decrease in world rice price 
scenario 
 
Name of cooperative PCR DRC NPCO NPCI EPC SRP 
1 Coricya 0.67 1.34 1.55 0.88 2.02 0.59 
2 Cocuricyi 0.50 1.10 1.55 0.87 1.89 0.69 
3 Cocuribu 0.74 1.63 1.55 0.89 2.02 0.67 
4 Cocuriga 1.05 3.21 1.55 0.91 2.48 0.84 
5 Cocurire 0.91 4.17 1.55 0.95 2.70 1.16 
6 Coperig 0.62 1.56 1.55 0.93 2.11 0.71 
7 Coprimwa 0.26 1.44 1.55 0.89 2.06 1.10 
8 Cocurigi 0.82 1.94 1.55 0.91 2.03 0.74 
9 Coproriz 0.61 1.19 1.49 0.96 1.71 0.60 
10 Corimak 0.61 1.16 1.49 0.96 1.76 0.56 
11 Coprorika 0.73 2.14 1.51 0.96 2.30 0.73 
12 Codervam 0.49 1.11 1.51 0.94 1.90 0.65 
13 Corvny 0.51 1.15 1.51 0.93 1.99 0.62 
14 Corinyaburiba 0.67 1.59 1.52 0.95 1.84 0.76 
15 Twizamure 0.88 2.62 1.52 0.95 2.16 0.88 
16 Inkingi y'ubuhinzi 0.61 2.14 1.52 1.05 1.91 1.02 
17 Jyambere nyarugenge 0.77 2.15 1.52 1.00 2.27 0.68 
18 Koterwa 0.54 1.63 1.52 0.98 1.93 0.86 
19 Korivarwi 0.50 1.28 1.52 0.97 1.91 0.72 
20 Copauki 0.83 1.92 1.52 0.99 1.96 0.68 
21 Copriki cyunuzi 0.58 1.02 1.46 0.93 1.75 0.48 
22 Isabane 0.81 1.63 1.46 0.99 1.86 0.52 
23 Mushikiri rice growers 0.67 1.13 1.46 0.95 1.71 0.46 
24 Kijumbura rice growers 0.76 1.43 1.46 0.99 1.74 0.53 
25 Corimu 0.74 2.29 1.46 1.02 1.99 0.82 
26 Cocuriru 0.55 1.12 1.55 0.96 1.85 0.62 
27 Corimaru 0.53 0.95 1.52 1.04 1.81 0.49 
28 Kopetwiteki 0.85 1.84 1.52 0.93 2.10 0.58 
29 Cocurivam 0.71 1.62 1.55 0.91 2.08 0.67 
30 Corimi 0.27 0.69 1.55 0.97 1.86 0.68 
31 Coprimu 1.05 2.61 1.51 0.95 2.37 0.59 
 
Regional 0.58 1.21 1.50 0.96 1.83 0.61 
Source: Research findings 
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APPENDIX G: Estimation of the IPP for rice, with FOB export price for India 
used as reference 
Stage/Steps Amount 
FOB India rice (25 % broken) (USD/MT) 385.00 
   + Transport cost from India, Kakinada port to Kigali, Rwanda (USD/MT)81 160.00 
   + Insurance cost (0.5 % of FOB & Freight cost) 2.74 
CIF at Kigali, Rwanda customs depots (USD/MT) 547.74 
    * Official Exchange rate 684.42 
CIF at Rwanda customs depots (Frw/MT) 374883.32 
   + Handling cost (Unloading, reload etc.) (Frw/MT) 10000.00 
   + Parking fees (Frw/MT) 555.56 
   + Storage cost (Frw/MT) 2000.00 
IPP  at customs depots exit gate (Frw/MT) 387438.87 
  + Transport Cost to rice wholesale market 16883.24 
IPP at entry gates of wholesale markets  404322.11 
  - Transport cost milling plant to wholesale market (Frw/MT) 3787.30 
    Loading cost (Frw/MT) 2000.00 
IPP at exit gate of the milling plant (Frw/MT) 398534.81 
     * Conversion factor (Paddy rice to Milled rice) 0.65 
IPP (Paddy rice equivalent) at exit gate of the milling plant (Frw/MT) 259047.63 
Marketing margin between the milling plant and the farm gate 0.55 
  / (1+Marketing margin) 
IPP at farm gate level(Frw/MT) 167127.50 
IPP at farm gate level (USD/MT) 244.19 
Source: Compiled based on the farm survey findings; Bahati (2014); BNR (2014a); Bolloré Africa logistics (2014); 
Bwimba (2014); Murangira (2014); CORIMI (2014); Mukaparadi (2014); Itegeri (2014); Mutsindashyaka (2014); 
Ndayizeye (2014); Basabira (2014); Nkubiri (2014); Seyanga (2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81
 The distance between India, Kakinada port to Kigali/Rwanda Bonded Houses is estimated at 4504.24 km ( nautical 
miles 2432.1) from Kakinada port to Mombasa/Kenya port using the sea way, and then 1435 km from Mombasa port 
to Kigali, using road (Google Map, 2014; Sea Rates, 2014). 
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APPENDIX H: PAM indicators in a scenario where the FOB rice price for 
India is used as reference 
 
Name of cooperative PCR DRC NPCO NPCI EPC SRP 
1 Coricya 0.67 1.13 1.39 0.88 1.70 0.43 
2 Cocuricyi 0.50 0.94 1.39 0.87 1.62 0.52 
3 Cocuribu 0.74 1.37 1.39 0.89 1.70 0.50 
4 Cocuriga 1.05 2.53 1.39 0.91 1.96 0.66 
5 Cocurire 0.91 3.16 1.39 0.95 2.04 0.95 
6 Coperig 0.62 1.29 1.39 0.93 1.75 0.54 
7 Coprimwa 0.26 1.21 1.39 0.89 1.72 0.89 
8 Cocurigi 0.82 1.63 1.39 0.91 1.70 0.57 
9 Coproriz 0.61 1.03 1.35 0.96 1.48 0.45 
10 Corimak 0.61 1.00 1.35 0.96 1.51 0.41 
11 Coprorika 0.73 1.70 1.37 0.96 1.83 0.56 
12 Codervam 0.49 0.94 1.37 0.94 1.61 0.49 
13 Corvny 0.51 0.97 1.37 0.93 1.67 0.47 
14 Corinyaburiba 0.67 1.35 1.37 0.95 1.57 0.59 
15 Twizamure 0.88 2.12 1.37 0.95 1.75 0.69 
16 Inkingi y'ubuhinzi 0.61 1.78 1.37 1.05 1.59 0.82 
17 Jyambere nyarugenge 0.77 1.69 1.37 1.00 1.79 0.51 
18 Koterwa 0.54 1.37 1.37 0.98 1.62 0.67 
19 Korivarwi 0.50 1.08 1.37 0.97 1.61 0.55 
20 Copauki 0.83 1.60 1.37 0.99 1.63 0.51 
21 Copriki cyunuzi 0.58 0.87 1.32 0.93 1.50 0.34 
22 Isabane 0.81 1.36 1.32 0.99 1.56 0.38 
23 Mushikiri rice growers 0.67 0.97 1.32 0.95 1.48 0.32 
24 Kijumbura rice growers 0.76 1.22 1.32 0.99 1.48 0.38 
25 Corimu 0.74 1.85 1.32 1.02 1.61 0.64 
26 Cocuriru 0.55 0.96 1.39 0.96 1.59 0.46 
27 Corimaru 0.53 0.81 1.37 1.04 1.54 0.35 
28 Kopetwiteki 0.85 1.51 1.37 0.93 1.72 0.42 
29 Cocurivam 0.71 1.35 1.39 0.91 1.73 0.50 
30 Corimi 0.27 0.59 1.39 0.97 1.59 0.51 
31 Coprimu 1.05 2.06 1.37 0.95 1.87 0.44 
 
Weighted average (All) 0.58 1.03 1.36 0.96 1.56 0.46 
Source: Research findings 
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APPENDIX I: Rice production cost for a selection of farm inputs: a 
comparative analysis of Rwanda, Thailand and Vietnam 
 
Eastern Province of 
Rwanda Thailand, typical farm Vietnam, (typical farm) 
    Rain fed Irrigated
82
 First farm
83
 Second farm 
Labour (hours/ha) 6445.98 200.00 791.50 2026.67 280.00 
Item 
 
        
Seeds 22.10 97.66 129.78 82.50 151.88 
Fertilizers, total  287.80 357.22 243.09 306.99 291.53 
Plant protection (pesticides) 32.30 0.00 101.63 93.75 204.50 
Labour 831.30 182.09 164.22 213.50 187.75 
    Total direct costs 1173.50 636.97 638.72 696.74 835.66 
Depreciation (machinery) 0.00 199.63 347.89 13.89 112.50 
Depreciation (farm buildings) 0.00 62.50 15.63 41.67 30.00 
Depreciation on (farming tools) 113.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    Total overhead costs 113.80 262.13 363.52 55.56 142.50 
Total production costs 1287.30 899.09 1002.23 752.30 978.16 
Source: Agribenchmark (2014:16-27), author’s survey 
Note: Land costs and administrative costs are excluded from this comparison since they were not 
mentioned in Agribenchmark (2014) where the data was retried for a comparative analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82
 Average production cost for the dry and wet seasons. 
83
 Since there were three crop rotations (rice-rice-corn), and since the data for labour hours and depreciation were not 
disaggregated for each crop, this study roughly divided the production data by 3 to get the share allocated for rice 
production for one season.  
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APPENDIX J:  PAM in a scenario where labour quantity is reduced by 25 % 
 
Name of cooperative PCR DRC NPCO NPCI EPC SRP 
1 Coricya 0.51 0.83 1.34 0.88 1.60 0.39 
2 Cocuricyi 0.38 0.69 1.34 0.87 1.54 0.46 
3 Cocuribu 0.57 1.00 1.34 0.89 1.60 0.44 
4 Cocuriga 0.81 1.81 1.34 0.91 1.81 0.56 
5 Cocurire 0.70 2.23 1.34 0.95 1.87 0.76 
6 Coperig 0.47 0.93 1.34 0.93 1.64 0.46 
7 Coprimwa 0.20 0.88 1.34 0.89 1.62 0.72 
8 Cocurigi 0.63 1.18 1.34 0.91 1.60 0.48 
9 Coproriz 0.46 0.75 1.30 0.96 1.41 0.38 
10 Corimak 0.47 0.73 1.30 0.96 1.44 0.35 
11 Coprorika 0.56 1.23 1.32 0.96 1.69 0.48 
12 Codervam 0.37 0.69 1.32 0.94 1.52 0.42 
13 Corvny 0.38 0.71 1.32 0.93 1.57 0.41 
14 Corinyaburiba 0.52 1.02 1.32 0.95 1.49 0.51 
15 Twizamure 0.68 1.53 1.32 0.95 1.63 0.56 
16 Inkingi y'ubuhinzi 0.49 1.31 1.32 1.05 1.49 0.65 
17 Jyambere nyarugenge 0.62 1.22 1.32 1.00 1.65 0.41 
18 Koterwa 0.43 1.03 1.32 0.98 1.52 0.56 
19 Korivarwi 0.39 0.78 1.32 0.97 1.52 0.45 
20 Copauki 0.63 1.15 1.32 0.99 1.53 0.43 
21 Copriki cyunuzi 0.44 0.64 1.27 0.93 1.42 0.29 
22 Isabane 0.63 1.00 1.27 0.99 1.46 0.32 
23 Mushikiri rice growers 0.52 0.71 1.27 0.95 1.40 0.27 
24 Kijumbura rice growers 0.58 0.89 1.27 0.99 1.40 0.32 
25 Corimu 0.57 1.32 1.27 1.02 1.50 0.51 
26 Cocuriru 0.43 0.71 1.34 0.96 1.50 0.40 
27 Corimaru 0.42 0.60 1.32 1.04 1.46 0.30 
28 Kopetwiteki 0.66 1.10 1.32 0.93 1.61 0.37 
29 Cocurivam 0.54 0.98 1.34 0.91 1.62 0.44 
30 Corimi 0.21 0.43 1.34 0.97 1.50 0.43 
31 Coprimu 0.81 1.49 1.32 0.95 1.73 0.39 
 
Regional 0.44 0.76 1.31 0.96 1.48 0.39 
Source: Research findings 
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APPENDIX K: PAM indicators in a 25% decrease of rice yield for each 
cooperative 
 
Name of cooperative PCR DRC NPCO NPCI EPC SRP 
1 Coricya 0.99 1.74 1.34 0.88 1.77 0.39 
2 Cocuricyi 0.72 1.38 1.34 0.87 1.64 0.51 
3 Cocuribu 1.11 2.14 1.34 0.89 1.77 0.48 
4 Cocuriga 1.71 4.85 1.34 0.91 2.30 0.69 
5 Cocurire 1.57 6.97 1.34 0.95 2.61 1.05 
6 Coperig 0.96 2.12 1.34 0.93 1.86 0.53 
7 Coprimwa 0.40 1.90 1.34 0.89 1.81 0.98 
8 Cocurigi 1.24 2.55 1.34 0.91 1.77 0.57 
9 Coproriz 0.89 1.47 1.30 0.96 1.47 0.43 
10 Corimak 0.90 1.46 1.30 0.96 1.51 0.38 
11 Coprorika 1.21 3.22 1.32 0.96 2.08 0.57 
12 Codervam 0.73 1.44 1.32 0.94 1.65 0.47 
13 Corvny 0.78 1.54 1.32 0.93 1.74 0.45 
14 Corinyaburiba 0.99 2.02 1.32 0.95 1.59 0.60 
15 Twizamure 1.41 3.70 1.32 0.95 1.90 0.73 
16 Inkingi y'ubuhinzi 0.97 2.86 1.32 1.05 1.62 0.90 
17 Jyambere nyarugenge 1.31 3.23 1.32 1.00 2.01 0.50 
18 Koterwa 0.83 2.15 1.32 0.98 1.66 0.71 
19 Korivarwi 0.75 1.67 1.32 0.97 1.64 0.55 
20 Copauki 1.29 2.56 1.32 0.99 1.68 0.51 
21 Copriki cyunuzi 0.86 1.30 1.27 0.93 1.51 0.30 
22 Isabane 1.28 2.20 1.27 0.99 1.60 0.35 
23 Mushikiri rice growers 0.99 1.43 1.27 0.95 1.47 0.27 
24 Kijumbura rice growers 1.15 1.84 1.27 0.99 1.48 0.35 
25 Corimu 1.24 3.31 1.27 1.02 1.71 0.69 
26 Cocuriru 0.81 1.42 1.34 0.96 1.60 0.43 
27 Corimaru 0.81 1.21 1.32 1.04 1.54 0.29 
28 Kopetwiteki 1.33 2.52 1.32 0.93 1.84 0.39 
29 Cocurivam 1.07 2.16 1.34 0.91 1.82 0.48 
30 Corimi 0.40 0.87 1.34 0.97 1.59 0.49 
31 Coprimu 1.76 4.03 1.32 0.95 2.18 0.41 
 
Weighted average (All) 0.86 1.55 1.31 0.96 1.58 0.43 
Source: Research findings 
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APPENDIX L: PAM indicators in a scenario where labour market wage is 
used as an estimate of the social price (shadow wage) of labour 
 
Name of cooperative PCR DRC NPCO NPCI EPC SRP 
1 Coricya 0.67 1.12 1.34 0.88 1.60 0.42 
2 Cocuricyi 0.50 0.92 1.34 0.87 1.54 0.49 
3 Cocuribu 0.74 1.28 1.34 0.89 1.60 0.44 
4 Cocuriga 1.05 2.19 1.34 0.91 1.81 0.53 
5 Cocurire 0.91 2.49 1.34 0.95 1.87 0.71 
6 Coperig 0.62 1.19 1.34 0.93 1.64 0.47 
7 Coprimwa 0.26 0.86 1.34 0.89 1.62 0.65 
8 Cocurigi 0.82 1.59 1.34 0.91 1.60 0.55 
9 Coproriz 0.61 1.02 1.30 0.96 1.41 0.43 
10 Corimak 0.61 0.96 1.30 0.96 1.44 0.37 
11 Coprorika 0.73 1.45 1.32 0.96 1.69 0.44 
12 Codervam 0.49 0.89 1.32 0.94 1.52 0.44 
13 Corvny 0.51 0.95 1.32 0.93 1.57 0.44 
14 Corinyaburiba 0.67 1.39 1.32 0.95 1.49 0.60 
15 Twizamure 0.88 1.93 1.32 0.95 1.63 0.60 
16 Inkingi y'ubuhinzi 0.61 1.64 1.32 1.05 1.49 0.73 
17 Jyambere nyarugenge 0.77 1.63 1.32 1.00 1.65 0.49 
18 Koterwa 0.54 1.29 1.32 0.98 1.52 0.61 
19 Korivarwi 0.50 1.02 1.32 0.97 1.52 0.50 
20 Copauki 0.83 1.59 1.32 0.99 1.53 0.52 
21 Copriki cyunuzi 0.58 0.87 1.27 0.93 1.42 0.32 
22 Isabane 0.81 1.37 1.27 0.99 1.46 0.38 
23 Mushikiri rice growers 0.67 1.00 1.27 0.95 1.40 0.33 
24 Kijumbura rice growers 0.76 1.25 1.27 0.99 1.40 0.40 
25 Corimu 0.74 1.78 1.27 1.02 1.50 0.61 
26 Cocuriru 0.55 0.96 1.34 0.96 1.50 0.44 
27 Corimaru 0.53 0.82 1.32 1.04 1.46 0.34 
28 Kopetwiteki 0.85 1.49 1.32 0.93 1.61 0.41 
29 Cocurivam 0.71 1.29 1.34 0.91 1.62 0.46 
30 Corimi 0.27 0.60 1.34 0.97 1.50 0.49 
31 Coprimu 1.05 2.02 1.32 0.95 1.73 0.44 
 
Weighted average (All) 0.58 1.00 1.31 0.96 1.48 0.42 
Source: Research findings 
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APPENDIX M: PAM indicators under a scenario where the rice import tariff 
is included in the estimation of the IPP 
 
Name of cooperative PCR DRC NPCO NPCI EPC SRP 
1 Coricya 0.67 0.67 0.97 0.88 1.01 0.00 
2 Cocuricyi 0.50 0.58 0.97 0.87 1.00 0.07 
3 Cocuribu 0.74 0.81 0.97 0.89 1.00 0.05 
4 Cocuriga 1.05 1.31 0.97 0.91 1.02 0.16 
5 Cocurire 0.91 1.53 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.36 
6 Coperig 0.62 0.73 0.97 0.93 0.99 0.08 
7 Coprimwa 0.26 0.71 0.97 0.89 1.01 0.32 
8 Cocurigi 0.82 0.96 0.97 0.91 1.00 0.10 
9 Coproriz 0.61 0.66 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.02 
10 Corimak 0.61 0.63 0.95 0.96 0.95 -0.01 
11 Coprorika 0.73 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.10 
12 Codervam 0.49 0.57 0.96 0.94 0.97 0.05 
13 Corvny 0.51 0.57 0.96 0.93 0.97 0.03 
14 Corinyaburiba 0.67 0.83 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.11 
15 Twizamure 0.88 1.16 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.18 
16 Inkingi y'ubuhinzi 0.61 1.03 0.96 1.05 0.92 0.27 
17 Jyambere nyarugenge 0.77 0.88 0.96 1.00 0.93 0.06 
18 Koterwa 0.54 0.80 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.17 
19 Korivarwi 0.50 0.64 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.09 
20 Copauki 0.83 0.92 0.96 0.99 0.94 0.06 
21 Copriki cyunuzi 0.58 0.54 0.93 0.93 0.93 -0.06 
22 Isabane 0.81 0.79 0.93 0.99 0.90 -0.03 
23 Mushikiri rice growers 0.67 0.61 0.93 0.95 0.92 -0.07 
24 Kijumbura rice growers 0.76 0.74 0.93 0.99 0.91 -0.03 
25 Corimu 0.74 1.01 0.93 1.02 0.88 0.15 
26 Cocuriru 0.55 0.59 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.02 
27 Corimaru 0.53 0.49 0.96 1.04 0.93 -0.06 
28 Kopetwiteki 0.85 0.85 0.96 0.93 0.97 -0.01 
29 Cocurivam 0.71 0.78 0.97 0.91 1.00 0.05 
30 Corimi 0.27 0.36 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.05 
31 Coprimu 1.05 1.07 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.01 
 
Weighted average (All) 0.58 0.63 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.02 
Source: Research findings 
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